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VALUATION AND CONDEMNATION PROBLEMS
INVOLVING TRADE FIXTURES
EDWARD L. SNITZERt
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem and Its Solution
W HEN HAMLET spoke his famous "to be or not to be" soliloquy,
he evoked a continuing debate through the centuries as to its
meaning. Admittedly, to compare the search for its meaning with the
continuing legal search to determine a "fixture" may be stretching the
point. Nonetheless, in few areas in the law has there 'been more wordi-
ness and confusion than in the effort to determine "fixtures". The state-
ment by a Missouri judge in 1877 that "the law in regard to fixtures
is in a somewhat chaotic state," is as true today as when he wrote
"[t]here is a most embarrassing conflict in the adjudged cases."'
Presently there is confusion and uncertainty in the appellate
courts as to when trade fixtures and equipment are condemned, and if
so, how they are to be valued and apportioned between lessor and
lessee. This confusion and uncertainty exists, in part, because of the
relative paucity, until recently, of condemnations in urban areas. Also,
the courts have found that the application of the confused decisional
law to the complexities of the law of eminent domain has not made for
easy solutions.
What follows is a suggestion that the common law tests of when
trade fixtures and equipment became a part of the realty, for purposes,
inter alia, of a mortgagor-mortgagee, lessor-lessee, or buyer-seller rela-
tionship, have limited application to the question of when such fixtures
were, or were not, condemned. The common law tests of intent, adapta-
bility, and annexation, being verbal tools utilized by the courts to
resolve conflicting status claims in trade fixtures, should now be, and
already have been by a few courts, supplanted by more pragmatic tests
available as a result of modem appraisal techniques. A rule of law
providing that trade fixtures 'and equipment are deemed to be "realty",
and therefore condemned, when they lose substantially all of their in
t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. B.S., Temple University, 1952; LL.B.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1955.
This article was prepared under a grant administered by the Highway
Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council,
and the right to copy is in the public domain.
1. State Savings Bank v. Kercheval, 65 Mo. 682, 686 (1877). Accord, Helms
v. Gilroy, 20 Ore. 517, 522, 26 P. 851, 853 (1891), stating the law of fixtures to be
"one of the most uncertain titles in the entire body of jurisprudence."
(467)
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place value upon severance, would be easily administered, consistent
with the constitutional requirement of the payment of "just compen-
sation", and otherwise equitable. It is a test that comports with the
economic realities of the condemnor-condemnee relationship. As will
be shown, the underlying policy consideration in the condemnor-con-
demnee relationship is "mainly economic." 2
B. The Common Law
At the outset, it should be remembered in determining whether
items are fixtures, that "who is suing whom for what" is of critical
importance. The relationship of the parties, and the interest for which
legal protection is sought, afford greater insight into what the courts
do, or should do, than does the futile effort to build "a solid pathway
across this veritable slough of despond."3 Generally, the fixture con-
cept has three purposes: (1) To determine which heir takes what
property when realty and personalty pass to different heirs;4 (2) to
determine the rights of competing creditors in a debtor's property;5
and (3) to determine the competing rights of landlord and tenant
concerning items attached to the land or building by the tenant.6 The
issue in each of the above situations is which party should prevail in
its claim -to the disputed items. This is not the same issue that arises
in a condemnation proceeding.7
Under the common law, everything attached to the freehold was
considered a part of it." As the feudal system of land tenure gave way
to the continuing process of industrialization, fixture law developed
to protect those who had made or financed improvements upon land
in which they had an interest less than a fee.
The case of Teaff v. HewittP is the leading American case formu-
lating the test for the determination of a fixture:
[T]he united application of the following requisites will be found
the safest criterion of a fixture.
1st. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appur-
tenant thereto.
2. Singer v. Oil City Redevelopment Authority, 437 Pa. 55, 261 A.2d 594 (1970).
Gottus v. Allegheny County Redevelopment Authority, 425 Pa. 584, 588, 229 A.2d
869, 872 (1967).
3. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the Law of Fixtures, 7 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1907).
4. Lawton v. Salmon, 126 Eng. Rep. 151 (K.B. 1782).
5. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841).
6. Mott v. Palmer, 1 N.Y. 564 (1848).
7. See note 24 infra and accompanying text.
8. KENT'S COMMENTARIES 467 (12th ed. 1873).
9. 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
[VOL. 16: p. 467
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2d. Appropriation to the use or purpose of that part of the
realty with which it is connected.
3d. The intention of the party making the annexation, to make
the article a permanent accession to the freehold - this intention
being inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and
situation of the party making the annexation, the structure and
mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for which the annexa-
tion has been made.10
1. Annexation
The concept of an item "being" real estate because it was a part
of, or annexed to, the real estate remains an oft stated part of the test
to determine whether disputed items are fixtures. Early cases held that
an article would be deemed to be "annexed", and therefore a fixture, only
where severance would occasion material injury to the freehold.1 Even
when this rule was relaxed, it was still said that slight annexation was
required, even if the item could be easily detached.' 2 The adherents
of the annexation doctrine feared that if the requirement of physical
attachment was removed completely, domestic animals on a farm, or
other loose and unattached implements, traditionally not a "part of" the
realty could be considered fixtures. 8
2. Adaptation
The annexation test gradually gave way to the continuing process of
industrialization. Thus, in Lawton v. Salmon 4 it was held that salt
pans affixed with mortar to the brick floor of a salt works were real
estate passing to the heir. The court reasoned that the salt spring was
a valuable inheritance, but that no profit arose from it unless there was
a salt work, which consisted of a building for the purpose of containing
10. Id. at 529-30.
11. See, e.g., Hill v. Wentworth, 28 Vt. 428 (1856).
12. Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636 (N.Y. 1839).
13. Id. at 654. As long ago as 1522, however, it was held that if a mill owner
took the millstone out of his mill to make it grind better, even though it was actually
severed from the mill, it remained a part thereof as if it had always been lying upon
the other stone. Accordingly, it passed by lease of conveyance of the mill, Wistow's
Case of Gray's Inn, 14 Hen. VIII, f. 25b (1522). In Liford's Case, 11 Coke 46b(1514), it was stated that a house key passed as part of freehold. This concept of
"constructive annexation" gave effect to the obvious intention of the parties, regardless
of the absence of actual physical annexation. Smith v. Carroll, 4 Greene 146 (Iowa
1853) (farm fence not sunk in ground) ; Roderick v. Sanborn, 106 Me. 159, 76 A. 263(1909) (storm windows and storm doors stored in barn); Byrne v. Werner, 138
Mich. 328, 101 N.W. 555 (1904) (building material on site of partially completed
building). But cf. Big Beaver Creek Corp. v. Beaver County, 37 Pa. Super. 350(1908) (County claimed it condemned 10,000 feet of oak lumber when it condemned
a bridge. Held, that since the lumber was not attached to the bridge, it was not
condemned).
14. 126 Eng. Rep. 151 (K.B. 1782).
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the pans. The case recognized that the adaptation of the pans for use in
the manufacturing plant would render illogical any holding that the
pans were not "part of" the plant. The concept of an item being deemed
a fixture because of its adaptation raised the specter, present in modern
condemnation law,15 that any item, fixed or loose, could now be deemed
a fixture. 6 Nevertheless, in the landmark decision of Voorhis v. Free-
man'" it was held that detachable rolls in a rolling mill passed with the
land to a real estate mortgagee. The court noted that almost any sort
of machinery, however complex in structure, may with care and trouble
be broken down and removed without injury to the building. Yet,
just as the easily removable doors and windows of a dwelling are
fixtures, for without them the dwelling would be unfit for use, so it
was held that the machinery of a manufacturing plant, without which it
would not be a manufacturing plant, must pass as part of the freehold.
The contest in Voorhis was between a purchaser at a mortgage fore-
closure sale and a creditor of the mortgagor who had levied upon the
machinery in an iron rolling mill. The court fashioned what was to
become the "Assembled Industrial Plant Doctrine," when it stated:
"Whether fast or loose, therefore, all the machinery of a manufactory
which is necessary to constitute it, and without which it would not be a
manufactory at all, must pass for a part of the freehold."'" This holding
was "based, first and foremost, upon the intention of the parties that the
lien of the mortgage on an industrial plant should extend to the machi-
nery and equipment therein and, second, on consideration of a public
policy to encourage financing of industrial plants."'" The holding in
Voorhis is now hornbook law. In an overwhelming majority of the
modern decisions, machinery indispensable to the functioning of an
industrial plant is deemed to be a fixture passing to the real estate
mortgagee.2
0
3. Intention
Annexation and adaptation are now said to be only circumstances
bearing upon the intention of the parties, which is deemed the con-
15. See pp. 30-33 infra.
16. Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636 (N.Y. 1839).
17. 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841).
18. Id. at 119.
19. Commonwealth v. Haveg Indus., Inc., 411 Pa. 515, 519, 192 A.2d 376,
378 (1963).
20. See Annot., 41 A.L.R. 601, 608-14 (1926); Annot., 88 A.L.R. 1114, 1115-17
(1934) ; Annot., 99 A.L.R. 144, 145 (1935). Courts have dispensed with the annexa-
tion requirement altogether where the items in question are highly adapted to use
in the freehold, even though the item is useful somewhere else other than on the
mortgaged premises. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kimball, 163 Ore. 31, 94 P.2d 1101
(1939) ; Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1424 (1937).
[VOL. 16: p. 467
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trolling factor in determining whether an item is a fixture.2' The rela-
tionship of the parties, therefore, is of particular importance in deter-
mining whether an item is deemed a fixture. For example, whether
items installed by a tenant are removable by the tenant upon the expira-
tion of the leasehold, or, permanent improvements passing to the land-
lord has been the subject of much litigation. The rule is that since it is
the usual intention of the tenant to remove all trade fixtures installed
upon the freehold upon the expiration of the term, he generally will be
permitted to do so where removal will not cause material injury to the
realty, and where the lease does not restrict or prohibit such removal.22
On the other hand, items which if installed by a tenant, would be con-
sidered removable personal property may be deemed fixtures, if in-
stalled by an owner, since an owner's addition to his property is normal-
ly intended to be permanent.23 The presumed intention between an in-
dustrial mortgagor and mortgagee is that all machinery of a manu-
facturing plant, without which the plant would not be such, is realty.24
Conversely, it has been held that the giving of a chattel mortgage on
fixtures and equipment by a real estate mortgagor indicated an intention
that such items were not intended to be part of the realty. 25
In Murdock v. Gifford,26 the intention of the owner in fastening
looms to the floor of a building was only to steady 'them during their
operation, and not, the court held, permanently to affix them to the
realty. Hence, the looms passed as personalty to a judgment creditor
of the owner rather than as realty to the mortgagee of the real estate.
On the other hand, it was held in Potter v. Cromwell27 that a portable
gristmill was intended to be a permanent part of the realty. Hence,
21. Phipps v. State, 69 Misc. 295, 297, 127 N.Y.S. 260, 262 (Ct. Cl. 1910).
22. Lindsay Bros. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 236 Pa. 229, 84 A. 783 (1912);Carver v. Gough, 153 Pa. 225, 25 A. 1124 (1893). Cf. Miles, The Intention Test in
the Law of Fixtures, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. 66 (1934).
23. Tyler v. Hayward, 235 Mich. 674, 209 N.W. 801 (1926); In re Mayor of
the City of New York, 39 App. Div. 589, 595, 57 N.Y.S. 657 (1899) ; Blake-McFall
Co. v. Wilson, 98 Ore. 626, 193 P. 902 (1920).
In In re Mayor of the City of New York, the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court stated:
But where the improvements were put upon the land by the owner, and it was
evident that they were so placed there to enable him to better use his own land
for the purposes for which he intended it, there could have been on his part nointention to remove these improvements, and justice did not require that the
common-law rule should be limited for his protection. For that reason it has
always been held that, so far as the owner is concerned, the law of fixtures wouldbe rigorously limited, and that whatever had been put upon the premises under
such circumstances that it would become a part of the freehold, or essential for
the purposes for which the freehold was used, would be, so far as the owner
was concerned, regarded as a fixture between him and any person to whom he
proposed to transfer the land.
24. See pp. 469-70 supra.
25. Ford v. Cobb, 20 N.Y. 344 (1859).
26. 18 N.Y. 28 (1858).
27. 40 N.Y. 287 (1869).
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it passed to the buyer of the factory and was not personal property
subject to attachment by a judgment creditor of the seller.
The effort of the courts to establish the intention of the parties
readily lends itself to endless litigation in search of the purposes and
motives of those installing fixtures and equipment upon the freehold.
There is no end to such cases and "rules" created by the specific facts
of each holding. The chaos referred to by the Missouri judge in 1877
remains.
II. THE FIXTURE APPRAISAL
The illusive tests of annexation, adaptability, and intention are
used to establish rules that, hopefully, foster desired policy results.
Hence, to protect the trade fixtures of tenants upon the expiration of
the term an item may be deemed to be personalty, whereas to encourage
financing of industrial plants, the same item installed by the owner may
be deemed realty. These rules attempt to resolve conflicting claims to
disputed items. In a condemnation proceeding, the issue is not who
should prevail as to disputed items, but whether the condemnor or con-
demnee should bear the economic consequences upon the fixtures of
the condemnation proceeding. The issue is not ownership or status, but
economics.2
What follows is a recapitulation of a modern fixture appraisal
of two business establishments. 29 The first is a bar. The second is an
industrial plant engaged in processing raw cotton into cotton felt. The
economic effect upon the machinery, equipment, and fixtures is de-
scribed by the appraisals.
The appraiser has divided his appraisal into four columns. The
first, "Cost of Reproduction New" represents the cost of the described
items fully installed on the premises as of the date of the condemnation.
The second column represents the "sound value", the "in-place value",
or the "fair market value in-place" of the described items as of the date
of the condemnation. This is the price which a willing and informed
seller and buyer would agree on for each item as installed and being
28. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Gottus v. Allegheny County
Redevelopment Authority, 425 Pa. 584, 588, 229 A.2d 869, 872 (1967):
We recognize that the underpinnings of the [fixture] doctrine in its various
applications stem from different policy considerations. In the mortgage cases we
have one consideration; . . . and, in eminent domain cases there are still other
underlying considerations, mainly economic (emphasis added).
Further, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, State v. Gallant, 42 N.J. 583, 202 A.2d 401
(1964), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United
States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962), have both recognized that
the economic effect of the condemnation is controlling.
29. The tables are from two condemnation cases in which the author was involved.
The full text of the Appraisals, presented as exhibits to the National Research
Council, are omitted from this article.
[VOL. 16: p. 467
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss3/2
MARCH 1971] VALUATION AND CONDEMNATION PROBLEMS 473
TABLE I
THE BAR
Cost of Value Liquida- Removal
Reproduc- Before tion and
tion Taking Value Reinstalla-
RECAPITULATION New (In-Place tion
Value)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Sink, stainless ---------- $ 155. $ 110. $ 15. $ 60.
2. Steam Table-..------ 195. 125. 10. 80.
3. Gas Stove -......--------------.. 135. 50. 0. 50.
4. Fan, 18".- . 130. 90. 10. 70.
5. Kooler-Keg Cabinet .... 1,500. 975. 50. 475.
6. Bar, semicircular ........... 1,950. 1,375. 0. 1,375.
7. Cabinet, steel -- ..-----------. 50. 35. 10. 25.
8. Liquor Compartment.... 115. 80. 15. 55.
9. Sinks, stainless ............. 310. 220. 30. 120.
10. Draft Beer Dispenser.- 580. 435. 50. 250.
11. Carbonated Water and
Soda Supply Unit_. ........ 600. 480. 100. 75.
12. Bottle Cooler Box ---------- 1,425. 1,075. 150. 925.
13. Bottle Cooler ------------ 1,050. 735. 100. 150.
14. Fan, wall, ventilating---- 160. 120. 20. 75.
15. Fan, ceiling --------.... 240. 155. 0. 155.
16. Air Conditioning System 6,750. 5,075. 250. 4,275.
17. Public Address and
Music System ............--- 215. 150. 25. 75.
18. Television Antennae ------ 125. 100. 0. 100.
TOTALS ------------------ $15,685. $11,385. $835. $8,390.
used in the premises. There is little literature, or other evidence, avail-
able describing the manner in which this price is determined by the
fixture appraiser. The cases suggest that the appraiser often takes the
"cost of reproduction new" figure in the first column, and then reduces
it by depreciating the item for physical, economic, and functional ob-
solescence." ° By so doing, the fixture appraiser, on a reproduction
cost basis, has arrived at a figure which is intended to represent the
fair market value in-place of each item. There is some authority, how-
ever, and personal experience confirms, that the fixture appraiser
should, and the better appraisers do, consider the price for which the
item would sell on the open market. (There is usually a market for used
equipment with price quotes available.) By securing this price, and then
30. See United States v. Certain Property, 388 F.2d 596" (2d Cir. 1968) ; United
States v. Becktold Co., 129 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Mayor of Baltimore v. Himmel,
135 Md. 65, 107 A. 522 (Ct. App. 1919); Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189
N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963).
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TABLE II
THE MANUFACTURING PLANT
Cost of Value Liquida- Removal
Reproduc- Before tion and
tion Taking Value Reinstalla-
RECAPITULATION New (In-Place tion
Value)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Air Conditioner----- $ 374. $ 187. $ 20.
2. Drier and Sterilizer----- 2,590. 1,554. 50.
3. W ash Tank .....................- 910. 546. 50.
4. Baling Press ---------------- 6,400. 3,840. 450.
5. Platform Scale------.... 2,675. 1,605. 25.
6. Bale Breaker- . 7,795. 4,680. 300.
7. W illow Machine ------------ 4,715. 3,300. 150.
8. W illow Machine ...........- 3,815. 1,908. 75.
9. Blower and Condenser-- 10,900. 7,630. 0.
10. Garnett Machines------ 38,250. 30,600. 2,000.
11. Garnett Machines -------- 57,350. 34,425. 2,250.
12. Delivery Aprons -------- 17,270. 12,089. 850.
13. Baler . 3,500. 2,450. 300.
14. Baler ... --- 4,425. 3,098. 300.
15. Air Compressor ---------- 1,135. 568. 75.
16. Air Compressor ............. 842. 253. 25.
17. Bins -..----------.......-------. -- 60. 42. 0.
18. Bins ------------------------- ------. .45. 32. 0.
19. Platform Scale --------...---- 2,675. 1,880. 50.
20. Time Card Recorder ...... 375. 338. 75.
21. Water Cooler-.-------- 305. 218. 35.
22. Burglar Alarm System-- 250. 250. 20.
23. Fire Alarm System ------ 725. 725. 35.
24. Vacuum System ..-.---- 13,237. 9,266. 100.
25. Cyclone ------ 1,125. 675. 0.
26. Cyclone .......... ............ 2,356. 1,649. 50.
27. Cyclones ---------......------ 1,593. 797. 0.
28. Electrical ---------........------ 24,053. 14,431. 750.
29. Mechanical Piping_....... 763. 614. 0.
TOTALS ----------.-.--....... $210,508. $139,650. $ 8,035.
$ 102.
1,554.
546.
2,800.
475.
1,800.
850.
750.
7,630.
18,000.
29,000.
10,400.
450.
300.
125.
125.
42.
32.
475.
22.
80.
66.
176.
7,250.
675.
1,057.
728.
14,431.
614.
$100,555.
determining the cost to install the item in-place, the fixture appraiser
can check whether his reproduction cost approach is reasonable.8
31. In United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1962),
the court of appeals noted that the figures of the fixture appraiser purported to reflect:
"present day sound market value for similar and comparable used equipment,
delivered, installed and connected, in good operating condition." . . . Yocum did
this by obtaining costs new and deducting estimated percentages of depreciation;
Shulman did it by taking second-hand prices as installed. . . .We see no reason
why the court was required to find the value of the machinery in situ to be
higher than the cost of buying and installing similar machinery there or elsewhere.
Thus the court rejected the argument that appraiser Shulman had proceeded on an
erroneous theory.
8
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The third column represents the amount of money which could
be realized from a liquidation sale of the item, as is, and where it is;
i.e., the cost to someone who would be willing to buy the article, and
then incur the additional expense of dismantling and removing the
item. The column has relevance only in determining the amount of
money that could be recovered by the condemnor upon the sale of such
items by it. It has no relevance to determination of the damages to
which a condemnee is entitled.
The fourth column represents the reasonable cost of dismantling,
moving, and reinstalling each item at another location. Reasonable ex-
penses of removal obviously cannot exceed the market value of the
item in-place. In addition, in ascertaining the reasonableness of the
removal expenses, the distance of the move has to be considered. Usually,
a move within the metropolitan area is considered reasonable.8 2
III. CONDEMNATION OF AN OWNER'S FIXTURES
It has long been held that items deemed "fixtures" are condemned
along with the realty. 3 As is the case with the common law determi-
nation of a fixture, the problem has been to decide when an item is
or is not a fixture, and hence, condemned or not condemned. The prob-
lem has not been easily solved.
In the leading case of Jackson v. State,8 4 the state condemned a
building containing machinery, shafting, elevators, and conveyors.
Judge Cardozo noted that "[t]he form in which these articles were
annexed to the freehold, and the purpose of the annexation, were such
that, as between vendor and vendee, they would have constituted
fixtures. 81 5 He further stated:
"Condemnation" is an enforced sale, and the state stands toward
the owner as buyer toward seller. On that basis the rights and
duties of each must be determined. It is intolerable that the state,
after condemning a factory or warehouse, should surrender to the
owner a stock of second-hand machinery and in so doing discharge
the full measure of its duty. Severed from the building, such ma-
chinery commands only the prices of secondhand articles; attached
to a going plant, it may produce an enhancement of value as great
32. Chapter 5 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. §§ 501-11
(Supp. V, 1968), provides that the distance of the move shall be reasonable not to
exceed fifty miles.
33. United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Los Angeles
v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933) ; White v. Cincinnati R. & M. R.R., 34
Ind. App. 287, 71 N.E. 276 (1904) - Allen v. Boston, 137 Mass. 319 (1884) ; Jackson
v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914); Phipps v. State, 69 Misc. 295, 127
N.Y.S. 260 (Ct. Cl. 1910).
34. 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914).
35. Id. at 35, 106 N.E. at 758.
9
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as it did when new. The law gives no sanction to so obvious an
injustice as would result if the owner were held to forfeit all these
elements of value. 6
Cardozo indicated, therefore, two bases for holding the items "a part
of the condemned realty." First, the items would be "fixtures" between
buyer and seller under the common law and would pass with a sale of
the real estate. Second, if the items had to be removed by the con-
demnee, they would "command only the prices of second-hand articles."
Until recently, most courts have used only the common law tests
and have ignored the more pragmatic test of economic loss. 7 Thus,
in the early New York case of In re Mayor of New York,"8 the City
contended that although a large portion of the machinery used by a
gas company in the condemned buildings were so affixed to the realty
as to be conveyed as fixtures between buyer and seller, nonetheless, the
fixtures were not condemned since they could have been "removed
without such injury to the machinery itself as would practically result
in its destruction for the use for which it was intended."' 9 The City
also suggested, strange as it may sound now, that all removal costs to
a new location would be the measure of damages. The court rejected
this argument, stating that it was ordinarily the intent of an owner
placing improvements upon the freehold to make them permanent
additions. It held that if the items were fixtures between buyer and
seller, they were fixtures, and therefore condemned, between condem-
nor and condemnee. As the court stated in In re Lincoln Square Slum
Clearance Project:40
Much greater proof of intention to make a permanent annex-
ation is required as against a tenant, or a chattel mortgagee, or a
conditional vendor. But such intention is readily presumed in the
case of an owner where (as here), he installs machinery in a
building which is especially suited for that purpose, and with the
object of carrying on his business therein. Correlatively, a con-
36. Id. at 35, 36, 106 N.E. at 758.
37. When Cardozo stated in Jackson that the machinery "attached to a going
plant . ..may produce an enhancement of value as great as it did when new," he
referred to the measure of damages of the condemned realty if the fixtures were held
to be a part thereof. It has been suggested that his statement serves as the basis
for the award of damages to a "going plant," as a going plant, so as to permit
recovery for loss of business value in excess of the fair market value of the realty
with the machinery and equipment attached thereto. See Aloi & Goldberg, A Re-
examination of Value, Good Will and Business Loss in Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL
L. REV. 604, 607, 614 (1968). Despite language to that effect in Banner Milling Co. v.
State, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 668, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925), no court has
yet so held.
38. 39 App. Div. 589, 57 N.Y.S. 657 (1899).
39. Id. at 593, 594, 57 N.Y.S. at 660.
40. 24 Misc. 2d 190, 201 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 153,
222 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1961), 12 N.Y.2d 1086, 190 N.E.2d 423, 240 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1963).
[VOL. 16 : p. 467
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demnee satisfies the test by the same evidence as would be deter-
minative against him as vendor .... 41
In Phipps v. State,4 2 the owner constructed a factory for the manu-
facture of fertilizer. Used in connection therewith was an engine-house
in which there were a ten horse-power, double cylinder, single drum
engine and a derrick. The engine rested upon a foundation of concrete,
four and one-half feet thick, sunk into the earth, and connected by
six three-quarter-inch bolts four feet six inches long with metal bars
laid on the bottom of the concrete. The derrick was set in the earth and
was supported by five metal guys, and the lower end of the derrick was
anchored to a 'beam buried in the ground. Both the engine and derrick
were used for a number of years in connection with the manufacture
of fertilizer. The issue of the case was whether the engine and derrick
were "fixtures" and therefore condemned. The court stated:
In this case I -think there was such an annexation and adapta-
bility of the property as to constitute the engine and derrick real
estate in this proceeding. They were securely attached to the free-
hold and were used in connection with the business of manufac-
turing fertilizer. They were a part of the plant, as essential to its
operation as the building, and, like the building could not be re-
moved except with such depreciation in value as would amount
to an appropriation of the property without just compensation.43
In Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Anderson,44 a plant
manufacturing finished lumber and mill products was condemned. The
plant was built solely for the purpose of housing the machinery, which
was securely fastened to the building. The owner intended to continue
in business at the plant for his life and thereafter to pass it on to his
sons. The court held that the evidence established an intent permanently
to affix the machinery to the condemned realty.
There have been numerous other cases in which the courts have
applied the common law tests of intent, annexation, and adaptability,
and in so doing, have held that the items in question were attached
to, and formed part of, the condemned realty. As was stated by the
California Supreme Court, however, "[t]he rules that are to guide us
in reaching a conclusion . . . are not in dispute, and are practically
41. 24 Misc. 2d at 196, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
42. 69 Misc. 295, 127 N.Y.S. 260 (Ct. Cl. 1910).
43. Id. at 300, 127 N.Y.S. at 264 (emphasis added). Although the court devoted
most of its opinion to the application of the common law determination of fixtures,
its awareness of the economic loss on removal presages the modern development
of the law.
44. 88 Ark. 129, 113 S.W. 1030 (1908).
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universal throughout the United States. It is in the application of these
tests that conflicts are found in the decisions of the courts." '45
In White v. Cincinnati,4 6 a paper mill was condemned. Machinery
in the buildings, used in the manufacture of paper, included: six
boilers, sixteen feet long and sixty to seventy-two inches in diameter,
each on a separate brick foundation made especially for that purpose;
three engines of eighteen, eighty, and three-hundred horse power;
refining engines and suction pumps; a rotary boiler sixteen feet long;
other machines, one weighing forty to fifty tons, set on a separate
stone and cement foundation, bolted to sills; steam pipes and other
appliances necessary in the manufacture of paper. The jury was in-
structed that the machinery was permanently attached to the building
-if "it could not be detached and removed without material injury to
the real estate ... ." The court held that this instruction was erroneous,
since it made the manner of annexation the controlling test, rather than
giving "united application" to the three requisites. In In re Post Office
in Borough of The Bronx,417 a building containing machinery of an
engraving plant was condemned. The condemnor argued that the entire
plant could readily be removed without damage to the machinery or the
freehold, and that no evidence had established that when the machinery
was placed in the building it was with the intent that it should remain
there permanently. The court then described the machinery as follows:
The motor is set up on a wooden platform about seven feet above
the floor, bolted through two walls with a heavy wooden column
supporting the corner of it. The motor is bolted to the platform.
The Prentiss lathe is fastened to three concrete pillars which are
built up through the floor. These pillars rest upon ground beneath
the floor. The machine weighs about 3,500 pounds. The Royle
special cylinder router weighs about 300 pounds and rests upon
the floor to carry the weight. The machine is bolted through the
floor into the beams. Power is transmitted to these machines by a
belt on a pulley. This machine was specially constructed for this
building and this work. The lathe milling machine is 6 feet long,
2 feet wide, and 4 feet high and weighs about 800 pounds. It is
bolted to the floor and is likewise fastened overhead to the ceiling.
The planer milling machine is 8 feet long, 4 feet wide, and 4 feet
high. Its weight is about 700 pounds. It is built into the floor with
angle irons, bracing it, in order to give it rigidity. It is operated by
power from the shaft in the same way as the others .... 48
45. Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 205, 25 P. 826, 829 (1933).
46. 34 Ind. App. 287, 71 N.E. 276 (1904).
47. 210 F. 832 (2d Cir. 1914).
48. Id. at 834.
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Without otherwise indicating why such machinery would have passed
between buyer and seller, the court then held that "though not without
some doubt, that the award rightly treated the machinery as fixtures for
which the United States should pay."49 In Los Angeles v. Klinker,5°
the building of the daily newspaper, The Los Angeles Times, was con-
demned. The building had been specially built to house the seven print-
ing presses of the paper, each weighing from eighty to one-hundred and
forty-seven tons, and other equipment necessary to print a daily news-
paper. The condemnee argued that the equipment was permanent
fixtures. The condemnor maintained that the equipment was personal
property; that it had been so assessed for tax purposes with condemnee's
consent for years; that prior to the condemnation, the condemnee had
negotiated with the public authorities upon a basis which contemplated
the salvaging and removal of the equipment to another location; and
finally, that the equipment could be removed without injury to it or
to the realty. The court held that the condemnee's intent to make such
equipment a permanent part of the real estate could be determined from
the physical facts which showed that
massive concrete foundations were constructed which, although in-
dependent, were connected both with the ground and with the
foundation of the building itself. These foundations were especially
designed to accommodate the presses, which were themselves
especially designed and built to be used in this particular building.
The presses were supported by and, in the main, embedded in these
concrete foundations. Such acts as these on the part of an owner
cannot be overthrown by equivocal circumstances from which a
different purpose might be suspected."
Apparently, no effort was made to determine the economic effect of the
condemnation. The case was decided on the presumed intent of the con-
demnee.
In State v. Dockery,52 the condemnee was a manufacturer of paint,
enamel, and varnish.
The equipment . . . consists of mixing, grinding, thinning and
filling machines, storage tanks and rack and labeling and packag-
ing devices. The third floor was constructed to withhold the weight
of the materials. Holes are cut in the third (balcony), second and
first floors to permit the materials to pass downward through con-
duits and conveyors as they go through the various stages of manu-
facture. The machinery, much of it heavy, is affixed to the build-
ing. Some of it is "lagged" into the floor; other machines are
49. Id. at 835.
50. 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933).
51. Id. at 210, 25 P.2d at 831.
52. 300 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. 1957).
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recessed in or bolted to the floor. Belts and pulleys used in the
operation of the motor-driven machinery extend from floor, to
floor through openings provided therefor. These machines, stor-
ages, tanks, conveyors, etc., are either connected with each other
or are permanently affixed to the building. Some of these machines
weigh 10,000 to 12,000 pounds. Hoisting and conveying apparatus
is suspended from heavy timbers installed in the ceilings for that
purpose.53
Without any evidence regarding the economic effect upon the machinery
upon removal, the court approved the instruction of the lower court. The
machinery was found by the jury and court below to be part of the
realty. This court approved the instruction that
if the machinery and equipment . . .were installed in and at-
tached to defendant's factory building for use and were used in
the manufacture of its products and that defendant intended such
machinery and equipment to become a permanent part of the realty,
they then became realty ...
There apparently was no evidence regarding the economic effect of the
condemnation upon the machinery. No testimony was introduced con-
cerning the possibility, or cost, of removing and reinstalling the equip-
ment elsewhere.54 On the other hand, it has been held that if the item
"is not a fixture, it does not go with the land." 5
If "it does not go with the land", not only is the condemnee not
entitled to be paid "in-place value",5" it is generally held that the cost
of removal of the items,5 7 must be borne by the condemnee.58
53. Id. at 447.
54. For additional cases in which the courts held that the items in dispute are
fixtures and therefore condemned by applying the common law rules, and without any
further evidence of the economic effect of the condemnation upon the fixtures, see
Wilmington Housing Authority v. Parcel of Land, 219 A.2d 148 (Del. 1966) ; State
v. Allen, 135 So. 2d 350 (La. 1961) ; State v. Peterson, 134 Mont. 52, 328 P.2d 617
(1958) ; In re East River Drive, Borough of Manhattan, 159 Misc. 74, 289 N.Y.S. 433
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Schreibman v. State, 31 Misc. 2d 392, 223 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Ct. Cl.
1961); Sunnybrook Realty Co. v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 739, 182 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Ct. Cl.
1959) (underground gasoline tanks) ; State v. Papanikolas, 19 Utah 2d 153, 427 P.2d
749 (1967) (machinery to prefabricate houses).
55. People v. Isaac G. Johnson & Co., 219 App. Div. 285, 219 N.Y.S. 741 (1927),
aff'd, 245 N.Y. 627, 157 N.E. 885 (1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571 (1927). See also
Futrovsky v. United States, 66 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (refrigeration equipment
used with a meat business held not compensable because no evidence established that
its removal would cause injury either to the realty or the fixtures) ; United States v.
Certain Land, 69 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (items that could be removed, but
were not because it was uneconomical to do so, were held personal property and not
compensable) ; In re Oakland Street, 13 App. Div. 2d 668, 213 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1961)
(fence, signs, wiring and gratings held not fixtures); Williams v. State Highway
Comm'n, 252 N.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 263 (1960) (stock in trade).
56. See tables, pp. 473-74 supra, col. 2.
57. Id. at col. 4.
58. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 88 Ark. 129, 113 S.W. 1030 (1908);
La Mesa v. Tweed & Gambrell Planning Mill, 146 Cal. App. 2d 762, 304 P.2d 803
(1956) ; State v. Hansen, 80 Idaho 201, 327 P.2d 366 (1958) ; American Salvage Co.
v. Housing Authority of Newark, 14 N.J. 271, 102 A.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Port
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Evidence of the cost of removal is generally held inadmissible
for any purpose, being irrelevant to the damage occurring to the con-
demned realty. 9 It is clear, therefore, that the standard judicial solu-
tion to the determination of whether items are, or are not, fixtures, and
therefore, condemned or not, has been to apply common law rules of
property, without any evidence regarding the economic effect of the
condemnation. By so doing, the courts have used rules developed to
resolve matters of status in property, in order to solve the problem of
who should bear the expense when property is condemned. A few
courts, however, have realized that the main policy consideration
involved in these cases is economic, and have begun to fashion rules of
law accordingly.
In Gottus v. Allegheny County Redevelopment Authority,"0 the
condemnees conducted a retail cleaning business on the condemned
of New York Authority v. Howell, 59 N.J. Super. 343, 157 A.2d 731 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1960), affd, 68 N.J. Super. 559, 173 A.2d 310 (1961) ; In re Appropriation
for Highway Purposes, 167 Ohio St. 463, 150 N.E.2d 30 (1958) ; State v. Superbilt
Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 281 P.2d 707 (1955); Becker v. Philadelphia & Reading
Terminal R.R. Co., 177 Pa. 252, 35 A. 617 (1896) ; State v. Vaughan, 319 S.W.2d 349
(Tex. 1958) ; Utah Road Comm'n v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963).
See also ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 69, p. 306
(2d ed. 1953); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1453 (1939). A few New York cases have
suggested that even if the items in question are not deemed fixtures and therefore
appropriated, the cost of their removal, can nonetheless be considered to the extent
that such cost enhanced the value of the realty. In Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240
N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 668, 205 N.Y.S. 911 (1925), the lower court awarded damages
to machinery and fixtures "not appropriated." The state appealed from the award,
but did not review the propriety of this award. Cf. note 32 supra. In Glen & Mohawk
Milk Assoc. v. State, 2 App. Div. 2d 95, 153 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1956), an allowance
was made for the difference between the value of the machinery and equipment
excluded from the appropriation if removed, and the value which such machinery and
equipment added to the real property. Contra, In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance
Project, 24 Misc. 2d 206, 198 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d
153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1961).
59. State v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 281 P.2d 707 (1955) ; Becker v.
Philadelphia & Reading Terminal R.R. Co., 177 Pa. 252, 35 A. 617 (1896). There
are a few cases to the contrary. Del Vecchio v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency,
147 Conn. 362, 161 A.2d 190 (1960) ; Harvey Textile Co. v. Hill, 135 Conn. 686, 67
A.2d 851 (1949); Mackie v. Miller, 5 Mich. App. 591, 147 N.W.2d 424 (1967). See
also ORGEL, supra note 58, at 311.
60. 425 Pa. 584, 229 A.2d 869 (1967). Gottus preceded Singer v. Oil City
Redevelopment, 437 Pa. 55, 261 A.2d 594 (1970). In Singer the condemnee owned
a grocery store in which were installed forty-one items traditionally used in such a
store: i.e., dairy cases, display units, counters, walk-in cooler, meat and produce cases,
etc. The in-place value of such items was stipulated to be $26,175; their fair market
value removed, $3,320; and the cost of removal transportation and reinstallation
elsewhere, $17,725. The condemnee testified that he did not relocate his business else-
where; that he sold most of the equipment to others; that such equipment was
removed; and that the equipment could have all been located elsewhere in order to
do business. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in fashioning a new doctrine to
determine when fixtures are condemned as part of the realty, held that the forty-one
items were not so condemned. The court first abolished the distinction between indus-
trial and other business establishments in determining whether machinery and equip-
ment were condemned as part of the realty. It held that an "Assembled Economic
Unit Doctrine" applies for all business condemnees. The doctrine is as follows:
1. [W]hen such a portion of the assembled economic unit is not removable from
the condemned property that that which is so removable will not constitute a
comparable economic unit in a new location, then all machinery, equipment
and fixtures, whether loose or attached, which are vital to the economic unit
15
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premises, which included a retail front for the collection and distribution
of clothes, clothes racks, pressing equipment, and machinery for the
washing and cleaning of clothes. The latter machinery was housed in
a building specially constructed for this purpose. After the condem-
nation, the condemnees left behind the cleaning and washing machinery.
This machinery was "merely" bolted to the floor, but through the in-
stallation of piping and special electrical wiring, the condemned premises
was adapted to its use. (The machinery included two washers, three
dryers, a filter, an extractor, two reserve tanks, a water repellant
machine and three pumps). The condemnees' witnesses first fixed the
fair market value of the realty as a cleaning plant in operation, without
consideration for good will, and deducted therefrom the value of the
equipment removed and ,taken to the new business location. The court
below charged the jury that machinery and equipment which were (1)
necessary to the operation of the business, and (2) placed therein for
permanent use, became fixtures, regardless of whether they were physi-
cally attached to the realty. Consequently, their in-place value could be
considered in determining the value of the condemned real estate. The
and a permanent installation therein, will be considered a part of the realty
under the Assembled Economic Unit Doctrine, so as to entitle the condemnee
to compensation therefor under §§ 601, 602 and 603(3).
Id. at 66-67.
2. [Where all or most of the machinery, equipment and fixtures of the economic
unit are removable without significant injury to them, such that the economic
unit is susceptible of continuance, as a comparable economic unit, in a new
location, only those items of machinery, equipment and fixtures not removable
from the condemned structure are to be considered a part of the realty taken
by the condemnor.
Id. at 65-66.
3. [W]hen the nature of the business requires a unique building for its operation,
such that no other building within a reasonable distance is adaptable to the
functioning of this business, then the condemned building, itself, will be con-
sidered an essential part of any meaningful economic unit in this industry.
In this situation, even though all or most of the machinery, equipment and
fixtures are removable, since no new site is available, condemnee 'cannot
maintain his economic position by relocating. Therefore, all machinery, equip-
ment and fixtures which are vital to the economic unit and a permanent in-
stallation therein will be considered a part of the real estate of the condemned
property under the Assembled Economic Unit Doctrine.
Id. at 67.
The court held, therefore, that the doctrine did not apply to Singer, since
almost "all of the forty-one items of machinery, equipment and fixtures were remov-
able and capable of being adapted and reinstalled in another location as a comparable
unit." Id. at 68. It also there stated that in the absence of any evidence showing no
other building within a reasonable distance in which the condemnee's business could
have been reestablished, even those items specially constructed to conform to the con-
demned realty, but nonetheless susceptible to removal and reinstallation elsewhere,
would not be considered as being within the Assembled Economic Unit Doctrine.
The court has placed particular emphasis on removability. If machinery is
removable without significant injury, Singer appears to require that it must be
removed. The test, therefore, of whether fixtures are part of the condemned realty,
is whether they are removable elsewhere so as to be an economic unit at the new
location. This holding and rationale has a distinctly familiar ring. See Teaff v.
Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 529-30 (1853). Singer, by again introducing the concept of
removability as being determinative of whether items are condemned, does not appear
designed to resolve the basic problems presented.
[VOL. 16: p. 467
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. It recognized that in eminent
domain cases, the underlying issue as to whether items are fixtures is
"mainly economic."'" After quoting from Judge Cardozo's opinion in
Jackson v. State, the court stated that:
This language imports that the economic integrity of the -individual
whose property is condemned should be preserved and that, as a
matter of justice, the Assembled Industrial Plant Doctrine should
be applied to the facts presented in this case. We agree with the
court below that the evidence warranted the conclusion that the
machinery involved was vital to the business operation and was a
permanent installation.62
In State v. Gallant,3 the condemnee installed twelve looms in the
condemned realty in 1917, and used them therein until 1961, when the
property was condemned. One of the looms was nine feet long, several
were fifteen feet long, and four were eighteen feet long. Their average
weight was 8,000 pounds. They were attached to a central power unit
by a shaft and belt system and were bolted to the floor with three inch
lag screws only. Because of their age, however, the only safe way to
move them would be to dismantle them at the old location and reassem-
ble them at a new location, which would give rise to complicated engi-
neering problems. Nonetheless, they could be so moved. Their "in-place"
value was $52,000. The cost of moving, dismantling and reassembling,
plus transportation costs would be $39,600. The trial court held that
the looms were not fixtures under Teaff v. Hewitt, 4 and consequently,
being personal property, no moving costs were recoverable. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed. It first asked "whether the con-
cept of just compensation . . .may require that condemnee receive an
award for their looms. We believe it may. . ."'5 It then stated that
the question of whether the condemnee should be compensated for the
looms does not depend on their being fixtures in other contexts of the
law. The court said that:
Where . . . a building and industrial machinery housed therein
constitute a functional unit, and the difference between the value
of the building with such articles and without them is substantial,
compensation for the taking should reflect that enhanced value.
This, rather than the physical mode of annexation to the free-
hold is the critical test in eminent domain cases.66
61. 425 Pa. at 588, 229 A.2d at 872.
62. Id. at 589, 229 A.2d at 872 (emphasis added).
63. 42 N.J. 583, 202 A.2d 401 (1964).
64. 1 Ohio St. 511 (1893).
65. 42 N.J. at 589, 202 A.2d at 404.
66. 42 N.J. at 590, 202 A.2d at 405.
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In United States v. Certain Property, etc.,67 a condemned build-
ing, erected and used since 1878 as a newspaper printing plant, con-
tained special equipment useful only for newspaper publishing. The
trial court made no allowance for the building finding the building to
be an encumbrance on the land warranting demolition. The trial court,
therefore, found the building to be antiquated and obsolete as a news-
paper plant. Nonetheless, it allowed the condemnee $178,050 for the
in-place value of the equipment. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rejected the argument that the equipment was not "taken."
Applying what it conceived to be the law of New York, it apparently
held the items taken because they were used for business purposes;
because they would lose substantially all of their value after severance
even though their removal would not damage the realty; and because
other evidence established their installation to be permanent. The court
noted that the condemnee's damages could not be limited to the market
value of the equipment after removal and before installation elsewhere,
"a figure reflecting a large discount for the heavy removal and in-
stallation costs a buyer would have to incur . . . it is this very factor of
large loss of value through removal that constitutes a principal reason
why New York regards such machinery as "real estate' ".6s
In Wilmington Housing Authority v. Parcel of Land, 9 the
Supreme Court of Delaware, after holding that the test of whether
items are fixtures depends upon the intent with which they are in-
stalled, noted that if the items were not deemed fixtures, and hence,
condemned, "the consequences [to the condemnee] might be [removal]
expenses equal to the value of the machinery. '7
The above cases suggest a new approach to the determination of
whether items are, or are not, fixtures, and hence are, or are not,
condemned. In the past, the courts engrafted upon the consequences
of an eminent domain proceeding the property rule of fixtures. As
seen, the effort to define with any precision whether an item is a fixture
was not notably successful in real property law. The policy considera-
tions underlying the fixture problem in real property law and eminent
domain law are not the same. The issue in eminent domain cases is
who pays. The issue in real property cases is who wins. 7' The cases
67. 306 F.2d 439, 446 (2d Cir. 1962).
68. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
69. 219 A.2d 148 (Del. 1966).
70. Id. at 153.
71. As stated more elegantly by Judge Lehman in In re Allen Street & First
Avenue, 256 N.Y. 236, 244-45, 176 N.E. 377, 380 (1931) :
Question as to the ownership of, or succession to, structures or fixtures annexed
to the land have arisen in many forms between landlord and tenant, vendor and
vendee, heirs and personal representatives. In each case the problem presented
is the proper division, if any, which is to be made between the owner of the real
[VOL. 16 : p. 467
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cited indicate a growing judicial recognition that the dominant issue
in eminent domain cases is who bears the economic consequences of
the condemnation. An effort, therefore, is being made to introduce
evidence bearing upon this issue. Instead of "annexation", "intent" and
"adaptability" being controlling, the controlling factor now becomes the
difference between the in-place value and the removal and reinstallation
expenses. (These amounts are listed in columns 2 and 4, respectively,
in the charts at pages 473-474 supra). If the difference is "substan-
tial," the courts of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Dela-
ware now appear to hold that the items are "fixtures" and condemned.
Consequently, in such a case, the condemnee would be paid the in-place
value. It will no longer be necessary for the fact finder to determine
the illusive "intent" by examining the myriad of facts that may or may
not be relevant to such intent. It will only be necessary for the con-
demnee to establish (or for the condemnor to refute) such intent by
asserting that when column 4 indicates "a large discount for the heavy
removal and installation costs a buyer would have to incur,"7 such
discount establishes the intent of the condemnee to install such items
permanently upon the real estate. Consequently, "it is this very factor
of large loss of value through removal that constitutes a principal
reason why (the law) regards such machinery as 'real estate'. ' 73
It should be noted that in all of the above cases, the supreme
court of each state made special note that the fixtures involved had
otherwise been permanently installed and suffered large economic loss.
In no case did the condemnee attempt to recover for, nor did the
court permit the recovery of, either the in-place value or removal costs
of merely "personal property." Hence, the result occurring in the case
of People v. Isaac G. Johnson & Co.74 would (and for reasons herein-
after noted should) occur even under the test suggested above. In
Johnson, the condemnee was awarded $117,526.68, which represented
the difference between the in-place value ($152,000) of tools and other
unattached equipment, raw materials and supplies, and their salvage
value ($34,473.32). It was conceded that the property was not fixtures
property, his assigns, privies, or successors, who base their claim of ownership
upon the assertion that the fixtures or structures have become a part of the real
property, and other parties who base their claim of ownership upon the assertion
either that the structures or fixtures have never been so annexed to the realty
as to lose their quality of personal property or that they have been so severed,
actually or constructively, as to gain or regain the quality of personal property.
In each case, the underlying question may be formulated: Do the structures or
fixtures constitute real or personal property between rival claimants of title?
72. United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439, 448 (2d Cir. 1962).
73. Id. at 448. In December 1969, section 608 of the Pennsylvania Eminent
Domain Code was amended so that "in-place" damages were recoverable for fixtures
when they "cannot be moved without substantially destroying its value." PA. STAT.
tit. 26, § 1-608 (1964) (as amended 1969).
74. 219 App. Div. 285, 219 N.Y.S. 741 (1927), a'ffd, 245 N.Y. 627, 157 N.E. 885
(1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571 (1927).
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and was easily movable. It was argued that the in-place value should
be paid because the property was intended for use in connection with a
going concern; could not be used elsewhere unless removed; and on
such removal, would be of little or no value over the cost of removal.
The court reversed the award, stating that:
The rule is that the court is to determine whether the article taken
is personal property or is a fixture. If it is a fixture, it is taken as
part of the real estate. If it is not a fixture, it does not go with
the land. 71
It is not suggested here, nor is it reasonable to expect, that the courts
will abandon completely the concept that only fixtures that form part of
the condemned real estate, as distinguished from movable personal
property, can be compensated for having been condemned. What is
being suggested here is not a repudiation of the idea that only fixtures
are condemned, but that the basis of determining such fixtures be
changed from real property considerations to considerations of economic
loss.
There are a number of reasons for this approach. First, to have
the courts now repudiate their virtually unanimous holdings that mere
personal property is not condemned would be a judicial reversal of
great proportion, with little likelihood of occurrence. There were com-
pelling reasons why the courts refused to hold that personal property
was condemned.76 Whether any change in such policy should now
occur is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, the concept of
"intent to make a permanent installation" is not being discarded, but
merely implemented by easily understood facts; i.e., the in-place value
and removal and reinstallation expense figures. These figures, however,
cannot in and of themselves conclusively establish that the intent of
placing such items upon the realty was to make a permanent installation.
If other evidence is available that the items were not intended to be
permanent installations, notwithstanding the great economic cost in re-
moval to another location, the fact finder should be free to find that the
items are "personal property" and are not condemned. For example,
the State of Michigan is very liberal in determining what fixtures are
condemned with the real estate. In In re Slum Clearance, City of De-
troit,7 1 the condemnee was in the business of electrolytic plating of tin
75. 219 App. Div. at 288, 219 N.Y.S. at 744.
76. See ORGEL, supra note 58, at §§ 69, 70.
77. It should be noted that those states that have statutorily provided for pay-
ment of the removal costs of personal property have either imposed dollar limits or
provided that in no event shall such expenses exceed the market value of such property.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 26, § 1-610 (1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 32.19(2) (1964)($2,000).
78. 332 Mich. 485, 52 N.W.2d 195 (1952).
[VOL. 16: p. 467
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss3/2
MARCH 1971] VALUATION AND CONDEMNATION PROBLEMS 487
and other metals. The metal was immersed in various chemical solu-
tions kept in huge tanks. The condemnee offered to prove that 21,000
gallons of chemical solution could not be moved at all, or, if moved,
would be at an expense greater than its in-place value. The Supreme
Court of Michigan held the chemical solutions to be trade fixtures, con-
structively attached to the freehold. Nevertheless, in In re Civic Center
in City of Detroit,79 the Supreme Court of Michigan reached a con-
trary conclusion. There, waterfront property was condemned. Moored
to the condemned property were four passenger vessels. The evidence
indicated that the cost of removal was between $59,000 and $121,000.
The supreme court upheld the refusal of the lower court to consider
these removal costs. It stated that:
No showing has been made that the vessels were moored at the
docks on the condemned parcels with any intention of making them
permanent accessions to the freehold. It may be assumed that they
were moored there with the intention of storing them until such
time as they would be put back in use, sold or disposed of in some
way. It clearly appears that the vessels fail to meet the test, namely,
the intention of the [condemnee] to make the vessels a permanent
accession to the freehold.8"
It is clear that raw material, inventory, work tools, and most un-
attached property are "personal property". Nonetheless, fixture ap-
praisers are well equipped to determine whether items over which there
is little or no doubt as to their legal status, can physically be located
elsewhere, and if so, the cost of such relocation. In most cases, if 'the
cost of removal is "substantial", the probabilities are that the items
were never intended to be moved by the condemnee.
IV. CONDEMNATION OF A TENANT'S FIXTURES
The problems of a tenant are even more complex than those of
an owner. When a tenant makes improvements to the realty, not only
must there be a determination of whether the tenant's fixtures were
condemned as part of the realty, but also of whether the landlord or
the tenant is entitled to recover.
79. 335 Mich. 528, 56 N.W.2d 375 (emphasis added).
80. 335 Mich. at 537-38, 56 N.W.2d at 376 (emphasis added). Cf., however,
State v. Fevers, 228 Ore. 273, 365 P.2d 97 (1961). A furnished apartment building
was condemned. The court found the refrigerators and gas ranges personal property
and not condemned, even though it was stipulated that similar apartment buildings
usually sold with such items included. The court stated that:
the argument . . . proves too much, because, while there is room for the con-
tention that the ranges and refrigerators are fixtures, this can hardly be said
with respect to the other items of personal property involved.
Id. at 282, 365 P.2d at 101. Hence, beds, coffee tables, etc., were not real property
and condemned.
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Under the common law, all improvements to the freehold inured
to the benefit of the fee holder."' A tenant, however, was permitted to
remove all trade fixtures installed upon the freehold upon the expira-
tion of the term, where removal did not cause material injury to the
realty, and where such removal was permitted by, or at least not barred
by, the lease or the common law. 2 The law of fixtures was evolved
out of a desire on the part of the courts to protect those who, having
an estate less than a fee in the land, had made improvements upon it
which, if they could not retain, would be lost to them ... " Since
the common law rule was fashioned by the courts to protect those who
made improvements to the freehold for business purposes:
As a general rule, an article may be regarded as a "trade fixture"
if annexed for the purpose of aiding in the conduct by the tenant
of a trade or business exercised on the demised premises for the
purpose of pecuniary profit, it being accessory to the enjoyment
of his term. 4
Between landlord and tenant, therefore, trade fixtures are deemed
to be the "personal property" of the tenant.8 5 If the fixtures had been
installed by the owner, however, traditional concepts deemed them to
be part of the freehold. If the additions to the freehold are not deemed
"trade fixtures", but merely "fixtures", the common law rule is that
all such additions inure to the holder of the freehold. The application of
these rules to the problems arising in condemnation proceedings has
been vexing. When improvements installed by a tenant are condemned,
three issues arise: 1) Between tenant and landlord, who should re-
ceive condemnation damages, if any? 2) Were the improvements con-
demned with the realty? 3) If the improvements were condemned with
the realty, what is the measure of damages? The courts have applied
the rules of property law, without general awareness of the differences
posed by the above issues, with resultant confusion and disorder.
81. See pp. 468-72 infra.
82. Lindsay Bros. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 236 Pa. 229, 84 A. 783 (1912) ; Carver
v. Gough, 153 Pa. 225, 25 A. 1124 (1843) ; State v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393,
281 P.2d 707 (1955).
83. In re Mayor of the City of New York, 39 App. Div. 589, 594, 57 N.Y.S. 657,
660 (1899).
84. Handler v. Horns, 2 N.J. 18, 24, 25, 65 A.2d 523, 526 (1949).
85. In re City of New York, 192 N.Y. 295, 301, 84 N.E. 1105, 1107 (1908), the
court stated:
As between landlord and tenant, the placing of machinery ... by ... the tenant
upon the leased premises for the purposes of trade or manufacture . . . does not
make the property so affixed a part of the freehold, but it still remains personalty
to such an extent at least that the tenant retains the right to remove it. The
trade fixtures of a tenant . . . remain personal property in the eye of the law
so far as the right of removal is concerned.
[VOL. 16: p. 467
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss3/2
MARCH 1971] VALUATION AND CONDEMNATION PROBLEMS 489
A. Between Tenant And Landlord
If the tenant does not have the right to remove the improvement,
being barred from doing so by provisions of the lease 6 or by operation
of law,8 7 the cases are uniform in holding that condemnation proceeds
for such improvements belong to the landlord.
Conversely, the tenant having the right to remove fixtures pre-
vails against the landlord for condemnation damages for such fixtures.8 8
86. State v. State Highway Comm'n, 411 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. 1967) (tenant
built and improved restaurant. Lease provided that, upon its termination, all buildings
shall become the property of lessor. Value of improvements inured to lessor). See
also Select Lake City Theatre Operating Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 277 F.2d 814(7th Cir. 1960) (lessee theatre installed chairs, seats, carpeting, draperies, vacuum
cleaner machine, box office equipment, and agreed that title thereto shall vest in lessor.
Tenant not entitled to recover for damages for such items) ; Beverly Hills v. Albright,
184 Cal. App. 2d 562, 7 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1960) (held that the tenant had assigned
to lessor all condemnation damages for trade fixtures. The lease read "[Lessee
hereby assigns to lessor his rights to any and all damages for property taken in such
proceeding and all such damages shall be payable to lessor." No mention of trade
fixtures was otherwise made) ; Bodnar Industries, Inc. v. State, 19 Misc. 2d 720, 187
N.Y.S.2d 359 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ; Marfil Properties v. State, 9 Misc. 2d 878, 168 N.Y.S.2d
234 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (the improvements were held relevant, however, to the value of
the unexpired leasehold) ; Jones v. Gonzales, 344 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1961). Cf. Jones
v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 21 Conn. Supp. 140, 146 A.2d 921 (1958)(clause terminating the leasehold did not bar tenant from asserting claim for trade
fixtures). Accord, Roffman v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 179 A.2d 99 (Del.
1962); In re John C. Lodge Highway, 340 Mich. 254, 65 N.W.2d 820 (1954).
In United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 250 F. Supp. 255, 257 (E.D.
Pa. 1966), the court, denying tenant recovery on other grounds, held that a clause
providing "all alterations, improvements, additions or fixtures ... shall ...become
the property of lessor . . ." did not give the lessor rights in the tenant's trade fixtures
upon a condemnation. Accord, United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d
Cir. 1962) ; In re Howard Laundry Co., 203 F. 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1913) ; Corrigan v.
Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N.E. 746 (1893) (tenant erected building under a lease
which provided that upon the expiration of the lease the building belonged to the
landlord) ; State v. Olsen, 76 Nev. 176, 351 P.2d 186 (1960) (under the terms of
the lease, wiring installed by a gas station tenant inured to the lessor. An award for
the wiring to the tenant was improper because the tenant had the right to remove
only the gas pumps and tanks as business fixtures, as they occupied "a different status"
and compensation was permitted) ; In re Triborough Bridge, 249 App. Div. 579, 293
N.Y.S. 223 (1937), aff'd, 274 N.Y. 581, 10 N.E.2d 561, 293 N.Y.S. 219 (1937)(tenant agreed to remodel building pursuant to lease which provided that all such
alterations were to remain upon the realty upon the termination of the lease. The
court held tenant not entitled to award for such improvements).
87. United States v. Certain Lands, 120 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1941) (failure of
tenant to remove buildings prior to expiration of term barred right to do so) ; In re
Horace Harding Expressway, 4 App. Div. 2d 683, 164 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1957) (in the
absence of any reservation of title in the tenant, the building belonged to the owner
who is entitled to an award for its taking). For additional cases, see Annot.,
3 A.L.R.2d 286, 305 (1948). See also St. Louis v. Nelson, 108 Mo. App. 210, 83
S.W. 271 (1904).
88. United States v. Seagren, 50 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1931), Annot., 75 A.L.R.
1495 (1931) ; People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal. App. 2d 897, 151 P.2d 641 (1944) ; In re
Wilcox, 165 App. Div. 197, 151 N.Y.S. 141 (1914) ; In re North River Water Front,
118 App. Div. 865, 103 N.Y.S. 908 (1907), aff'd, 189 N.Y. 508, 81 N.E. 1162 (1907) ;
Antonowsky v. State, 14 Misc. 2d 689, 180 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ; Queensboro
Farm Prods. v. State, 6 Misc. 2d 445, 161 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Ct. Cl. 1956), aff'd, 11
Misc. 2d 363, 171 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; State v. DeLay, 114 Ohio L. Abs.2d 272, 181 N.E.2d 706 (1959); Hopper v. Davidson County, 206 Tenn. 393, 333
S.W.2d 917 (1960) (where tenant had an express reservation of title in trade
fixtures, the right of removal is a necessary implication thereof). See also Annot.,
3 A.L.R.2d 286, 302 (1948).
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Some tenant-installed improvements have, nevertheless, been held
not to be trade fixtures because they became a structural part of the
building. Here, some courts have held that the installed improvements
are "distinctively realty", and any condemnation damages for such im-
provements inure to the benefit of the landlord. s 9 The distinction be-
tween trade fixtures belonging to the tenant and fixtures "distinctively
realty", and therefore belonging to the landlord, is also "anything but
bright."9 Since the purpose of the trade fixture rule is to protect the
tenant, courts have generally taken a generous view of what may be
removed without substantial injury to the freehold.9'
Whether improvements are "trade fixtures" or "distinctively
realty" does not appear to have been a serious problem in the apportion-
ment of condemnation damages. Usually, the matter is either expressly
covered by lease agreement, or the item in question has otherwise been
clearly delineated by past decisions.
B. Were The Improvements Condemned?
A much more serious problem involves the determination of
whether the improvements were condemned with the realty. To make
this determination, the courts have used two conceptual legal doctrines,
both of which have been very difficult to apply. On the one hand, some
courts have approached the matter simply as a question of property
law: If the fixtures, though removable by the tenant, had been in-
stalled by the landlord, would they have been part of the realty? The
question then becomes "what has the condemnor taken?" In making
this determination, the same problems of annexation, intent, and adapta-
tion occurring with an owner are present.
Other courts, however, have treated the problem not as being what
the condemnor has taken, but what has the condemnee lost ?92 By so
89. Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105, 189 N.E.2d 606 (1963) ;
In re Seward Park Slum Clearance Project, 10 App. Div. 2d 498, 200 N.Y.S.2d 802
(1960) ; In re Triborough Bridge, 249 App. Div. 579, 293 N.Y.S. 223 (1937);
Century Holding Co. v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 200 App. Div. 62, 192 N.Y.S. 380
(1922) ; In re Delancey Street, 120 App. Div. 700, 105 N.Y.S. 779 (1907).
90. United States v. Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1965).
91. Antonowsky v. State, 14 Misc. 2d 689, 180 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
In re City of New York, 192 N.Y. 295, 302, 84 N.E. 1105 (1908) ; Century Holding
Co. v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 200 App. Div. 62, 192 N.Y.S. 380 (1922). In Century
Holding the court concluded that if the removal would deface or injure the walls,
ceilings, or floors, the improvements belonged to the lessor. On the other hand, the
court in United States v. Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 1965), stated
that asphalt cemented to the floor by the tenant belongs to the owner only if "the
asphalt became the only floor or integral with it, but we see no good reason for
distinguishing a covering of asphalt tiles, removable without damage to the basic
structure, or a false ceiling similarly removable, from the partitions held to belong
to the tenant in the Century Holding case."
92. Beverly Hills v. Albright, 184 Cal. App. 2d 562, 7 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1960),
illustrates the confusion of the court in applying these various doctrines.
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doing, they consider the contractual relationship between landlord and
tenant to determine whether the improvements were condemned. To
these courts, because the tenant has the right to remove the fixtures
establishes that the fixtures cannot be part of the realty, although as
already noted, 3 all courts hold that unless the tenant has this right, the
improvements belong to the lessor. Clauses eliminating the leasehold
become controlling under the second approach, while courts holding
the matter to be a question of what the condemnor has taken, deem
such clauses irrelevant.94
1. What has the condemnor taken?
In In re Allen Street & First Avenue,95 the premises occupied by
a tenant-butcher was condemned. It was admitted that trade fixtures
installed by the tenant would have been considered part of the realty
if installed by the owner. The tenant had the right to remove the
fixtures, and the condemnation occurred only a few months before
the lease term expired. The lease contained a clause which provided
that upon the condemnation of the freehold, the lease term ended.
Previously, the courts of New York had held that buildings, ma-
chinery, and fixtures installed by a tenant were condemned if the ten-
ant had an unexpired term at the time of the condemnation. 6 The City
argued that because the lease agreement provided that the fixtures
were the personal property of the tenant, could be removed and did
not belong to the landlord, the fixtures consequently were not con-
demned. Therefore, being the personal removable property of the
tenant, the tenant should remove them at his expense. The result which
the City sought, therefore, was to compel the tenant to remove the
fixtures at his cost without any payment from the condemnor at all.
The court saw the issue as being whether the tenant's fixtures
were real property. Consequently, the lessee's loss, being the remainder
of the unexpired term which he had bargained away, and the possibility
of renewal, were held to be irrelevant. It stated:
93. See notes 86 & 87 supra and accompanying text.
94. Once it is held that the fixtures form part of the condemned realty, however,
the measure of damage of the tenant's fixtures is always what the condemnee has
lost, and not what the condemnor has taken. See United States v. Certain Property,
344 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1965); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217
U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
95. 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931).
96. The tenant was held to be entitled to what that property in use in connection
with his leasehold is reasonably worth at the time of its condemnation. In re North
River Water Front, 118 App. Div. 865, 103 N.Y.S. 908 (1907), aff'd, 189 N.Y. 508,
81 N.E. 1162 (1907). See also Matter of Willcox, 165 App. Div. 197, 151 N.Y.S.
141 (1914) ; In re Water Front On North River, 192 N.Y. 295, 84 N.E. 1105 (1908);
In re Avenue A, 66 Misc. 488, 122 N.Y.S. 321 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
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The City appropriated the real property in the condition in which
it was at the time it took title, and then the fixtures were part of
the real property . . . Perhaps severance at the expiration of the
tenant's term . . .might have destroyed some of the value of the
property; perhaps the parties might have chosen to preserve that
value either by renewal of the lease or by transfer of title to the
fixtures from the tenant to the owner . . .Choice lay with the
tenant and the landlord, and how that choice would have been
exercised rests in speculation which does not concern the courts
in this jurisdiction. 7
Deciding, however, that the agreement between the landlord and
tenant does not bar the fixtures from being "taken" as part of the
realty, does not determine in any particular case whether the fixtures
otherwise are condemned as part of the realty. In Allen it was stipu-
lated that the fixtures were so annexed to the real estate -that they would
have become part of the real property if they had been installed per-
manently by the owner of the fee. Those courts that follow the Allen
decision, therefore, still have to determine whether the fixtures "formed
part of" the condemned realty. In Allen, the court stated that the term
" 'fixtures' as used in this opinion is confined to articles so affixed to
the realty that they would have become part of the realty if they had
been installed permanently by the owner of the fee. It excludes 'goods
affixed to the realty which . . .would not have' 'become part there-
of.' "'8 The difficulties with this test are apparent. The items must be
"enough" realty so as to become condemned as a part thereof, but not
97. 256 N.Y. 236, 248, 176 N.E. 377, 381. Accord, Burkhart v. United States,
227 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Seagren, 50 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1931) ;
Gilbert v. State, 85 Ariz. 321, 338 P.2d 787 (1959) ; People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal. 2d
897, 151 P.2d 641 (1944) ; Roffman v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 179 A.2d 99(Del. 1962) ; Tinnerhoim v. State, 15 Misc. 311, 179 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ;Queensboro Farm Prods. v. State, 6 Misc. 2d 445, 161 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Ct. Cl. 1956),
aff'd, 11 Misc. 2d 363, 171 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; State v. Delay, 87 Ohio L.
Abs. 449, 181 N.E.2d 706 (1959).
In Klopstock and Gilbert the condemnors argued that because the condemnee
had the right to remove the fixtures, they remained the personal property of the
tenant, and no compensation should be awarded. The courts answer this argument by
stating that the right of removal between landlord and tenant does not convert what
is otherwise real property into personal property. P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 581(2) (3d ed. 1950):
It frequently happens that ...the tenant erects buildings upon the leased land
or puts fixtures into the building for his own use. It is well settled that, even if
the buildings or fixtures are attached to the real estate and would pass with a
conveyance of the land, as between landlord and tenant they remain personal
property, and, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, may be
removed by the tenant at any time during the continuation of the lease provided
such removal may be made without injury to the freehold. This rule is, however,
entirely for the protection of the tenant and cannot be invoked by the condenming
party. If the buildings or fixtures are attached to the real estate, they must be
treated as real estate in determining the total award, but in apportioning the
award they are treated as personal property and credited to the tenant.
98. 256 N.Y. 236, 240, 176 N.E. 377, 380 (1931).
[VOL. 16: p. 467
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so much as to become "distinctively realty". 9 On the other hand, if
the items are deemed personal property, they are not condemned at all.'00
If they are not condemned, the tenant is not entitled to their cost
of removal. 10'
The case law indicates that the courts have had at least as much
difficulty establishing when a tenant's fixtures are part of the realty,
as they have had in making such a determination for an owner. In the
leading case of In re Whitlock Avenue, 02 a tenant silk ribbon manu-
facturer was awarded $45,000 for machinery, looms, and loose extra
parts used in connection with the looms. The spare parts were standard
articles bought from dealers. The harnesses were interchangeable on
the looms and were not affixed to the building. The looms were at-
tached to the floor by screws and bolts to keep them from vibrating
or shifting. They could be removed without any injury to themselves
or to the freehold. The looms had been moved by the condemnee sev-
eral times before as it moved its business. Some of the tenant's machines
had steam and water connections, which could easily be disconnected.
Another tenant, in the same case, had been awarded damages for
machinery, equipment, and many items not attached to the realty. The
court easily found that steel lockers, cabinets, trucks, racks, tables,
spare parts, etc., were "personal property" and not condemned. As
for the looms and other machinery, "much of this, despite its size
and weight, was readily removable and was not installed in a permanent
manner. Most, if not all, of this machinery had been removed from
the claimant's place of business. Only such machinery as cannot be re-
moved without injury to it or to the freehold,0 3 or concerning which
99. See United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1962),
in which the Second Circuit divided tenant improvements into three categories under
New York law: Items "distinctively realty" belonging to the landlord, items "clearly"
personal property, and items "which are removable without material injury to the
freehold remain the property of the tenant even though they are classified as realty
because they are severely damaged or lose substantially all their value on severance."
"The lines marking the boundaries of the 'middle category' are anything but bright,
and views on cases near the boundaries will necessarily differ." United States v.
Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965).
100. Belinsky v. State, 24 App. Div. 908, 264 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1965) ; Rossi v. State,
31 Misc. 2d 205, 223 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1961) ; Bodnar Indus., Inc. v. State, 19 Misc. 2d
720, 187 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ; Antonowsky v. State, 14 Misc. 689, 180
N.Y.S.2d 966 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ; In re Whitlock Avenue, 278 N.Y. 276, 16 N.E.2d 281(1938) ; In re Fulton Street, 225 App. Div. 855, 7 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1938).
101. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 312 (1948).
102. 278 N.Y. 276, 16 N.E.2d 281 (1938). Pennsylvania, by amending section 608
of its Eminent Domain Code in December 1969, has solved by statute many of the
problems here discussed. That section enables a tenant to recover in-place damages
of its fixtures if they cannot be moved without substantially destroying their value.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-608 (1969).
103. The inconsistency of the rules is apparent. In order for the fixtures to inure
to the benefit of the tenant vis-i-vis the landlord, the fixtures must be removable
without material injury to the freehold. In order for the tenant to recover against the
condemnor, the fixtures must be such as would cause material injury to the freehold.
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there may be other evidence of an installation of a permanent nature,
should be held to constitute a fixture.' 1 ° 4 On the other hand, it has
been easy for the courts to hold that buildings, 10 5 diners, 0 6 outdoor ad-
vertising signs,' 7 and machinery installed in a building especially con-
structed for it' are condemned as being part of the realty. The real
problem, with tenants as well as with owners, has been to determine
the nature of those improvements between personalty and real prop-
erty.' 09 Here again, as with owners, a few courts have begun to realize
that the solution to the problem lies with formulating a test that reflects
the economic realities of a condemnation proceeding.
In In re North River Water Front,"' a tenant installed ma-
chinery which was built into the building or constructed upon founda-
tions built into the ground, and connected with shafting which was
itself connected with either steam or water pipes. Some of the ma-
chinery could have been removed without serious injury to the freehold.
The court stated that "it would be manifestly unjust to treat such
property as personal property when its value after it was severed from
the building would be a very small percentage of its value as a part of
the building for the use of the tenants in the business which they were
conducting.""' It went on to state that "as to such personal property
as can be readily removed and would have a substantial value discon-
104. Id. at 283. In In re Fulton Street, 255 App. Div. 855, 7 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1938),
Bodnar Indus., Inc. v. State, 19 Misc. 2d 720, 187 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Ct. Cl. 1959),
and Belinsky v. State, 24 App. Div. 908, 264 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1965), the courts, citing
Whitlock, and without further analysis, denied the tenant's claim that the fixtures in
question were condemned as part of the realty. In Whitlock and Belinsky, however,
and again without further discussion, ofice partitions and electric wiring, and a
flatwork iron were deemed condemned fixtures.
105. United States v. Seagren, 50 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
106. Tinnerholm v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 311, 179 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
107. Buffalo v. Michael, 16 N.Y.2d 88, 209 N.E.2d 776, 262 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1965)
Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 99, 213 N.Y.S.2d 819 (App.
Div. 1961); George F. Stein Brewery, Inc. v. State, 200 Misc. 424, 103 N.Y.S.2d
946 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
108. In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 24 Misc. 2d 190, 201 N.Y.S.2d
443 (Sup. Ct. 1959), modified, 15 App. Div. 2d 153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1961), aff'd,
12 N.Y.2d 1086, 190 N.E.2d 423 (1963).
109. In Schreibman v. State, 31 Misc. 2d 392, 400-01, 223 N.Y.S.2d 670, 679
(Ct. Cl. 1961), the court found that:
the following equipment was permanently attached to the realty . . . elevators,
feed elevator, and hoist, heating cables, all thermostats except those in the egg
room, switches, fans, shutters, roosts. All other equipment including the auto-
matic feeders, waters, nests, shell hoppers, dropping frames, etc., we find were not
permanently installed so as to become part of the realty. Moreover, this equip-
ment was easily removable without damage to itself or to the buildings .... We
also find that there was a local market for such equipment so that it has a market
value separate and apart from the buildings, rather than mere salvage value.
There was no other indication why some items were, or were not, part of the realty.
There was no indication of the economic effect on the equipment having a market
value separate and apart from the buildings.
110. 118 App. Div. 865, 103 N.Y.S. 908 (1907), aff'd, 189 N.Y. 508, 81 N.E.
1162 (1907).
111. Id. at 866-67, 103 N.Y.S. at 909 (emphasis added).
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nected from the building this rule would not apply .... 11112 Notwith-
standing the early understanding by this New York Court of the
crucial importance of the economic effect of the condemnation upon
the fixtures, it is only recently that New York courts have clearly
and broadly applied this rule in behalf of tenant-condemnees." 3
In In re Seward Park Slum Clearance Project,114 the court held
that "an award in condemnation may also be made for property, albeit
readily removable without damage to the freehold, if such property were
used for business purposes and would lose substantially all of its value
after severance ... "115
In Marraro v. State of New York," 6 the court stated that "al-
though it is true that electric and plumbing connections would ordi-
narily be an integral part of the real estate . . . in this instance it has
been found . . . that these connections were easily removable and had
been put in by the tenants solely to service fixtures installed for the
individual purposes of their several occupancies."' It, therefore,
sustained an award for such connections on behalf of the tenant."'
In In re Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project,"9
the tenant did not claim that machinery and equipment formed part of
the condemned realty. It was claimed, however, that wiring, piping,
connections, and attachments needed to make the machines function
were not useable elsewhere except with the loss of all or substantially
all their value after severance. The City admitted that the wiring, pip-
ing, and connections were compensable to the tenant. It contended,
nevertheless, that attachments such as bolts, skids, platforms, belts,
controls, and similar equipment were not part of the realty and there-
fore not condemned. The court stated that "[t] he definition of a fixture
is satisfied by the fact that some annexation to the building is involved
and that the item in question would lose all or substantially all its
value after severance.' 120
In In re Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project,'2'
a distinct though similarly entitled case, the city admitted that the
special electric wiring, plumbing, water lines, and ductwork of tenants'
112. Id. at 867, 103 N.Y.S. at 909 (emphasis added).
113. See note 99 supra.
114. 10 App. Div. 2d 498, 200 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1960).
115. Id. at 500, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
116. 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606 (1963).
117. Id. at 296-97, 189 N.E.2d 612-13.
118. Accord, Morganthal v. State of New York, 15 App. Div. 2d 712, 223 N.Y.S.2d
558 (1962).
119. 51 Misc. 2d 1005, 274 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
120. Id. at 1007, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 726 (emphasis added).
121. 51 Misc. 2d 1008,*274 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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air-conditioning systems were compensable, but contested an allowance
for the units themselves and their water towers. The Court stated the
applicable rule to be as follows:
The mere fact of removability is not the criterion for distinguishing
between a fixture compensable in eminent domain and a non-com-
pensable item of mere personalty. Almost all trade fixtures are
removable, some with relative ease and others with some difficulty.
So long as it is annexed or connected in some fashion to the struc-
ture, it may fall within the definition of a fixture if it meets the
more important tests of use and adaptability to the premises and a
disproportionate loss in value upon enforced severance there-
from.
1 22
Applying this test it found that the water towers were fixtures, since
they were affixed to the roof, burdened with heavy moving expenses,
and subject to rust and corrosion. "[T]he owner must be deemed to
have reasonably expected to realize its value through use during the
term of his occupancy at those premises and to have intended it as a
permanent affixation at that place for the period of its useful life. It
would, of course, also be subject to substantial loss of value upon
severance."12 The air-conditioning units, however, ranging in size
from two to twenty tons, easily movable elsewhere, were held not com-
pensable unless it was shown that each unit together with its special
equipment "was intended as an integrated air-conditioning system to be
a permanent installation for its useful life . . . and would lose a large
part of its value if removed for use in other premises which might
present some variant factor of layout, size, type of structure, exposure
to sun, ingress, egress, etc.' 1 2
4
This case vividly illustrates the ease with which a court could
find that items were, or were not, part of the condemned realty by
applying a test that seeks an economic, rather than a verbal, answer.125
122. Id. at 1009, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 721-22.
123. Id. at 1010, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
124. Id. at 1011, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
125. See also In re Tompkins Square Urban Renewal Project, 27 App. Div. 2d
810, 278 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967). The in-place value of installed machinery was stipulated
to be $47,722. After severance, and before any allowance for dismantling, removal
and reassembly, the value of the machinery was $9,466. "[T]he city thus does not
challenge the . . . contention that the sound value of the item, if severed, would be
nominal or nil. ... Id. at 812 N.Y.S.2d at 35. The court held the items to be
condemned fixtures. The dissent stated:
Nor is the difference between the value of the article installed and its value
when removed a determining factor. Many machines, though regular articles of
commerce, do not move with frequency in the market, and transactions are
limited to those with a specialized interest. Such articles cannot be readily sold
except at a substantial sacrifice. Nor can they be moved without considerable
expense. These factors may reduce their detached value in the hands of the
claimant to practically nothing and, at the same time, they could have consider-
[VOL. 16: p. 467
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For all of the reasons set forth in the discussion regarding an
owner's fixtures, the evolving tenant law in New York affords a good
example of the ease, simplicity, and fairness of the test of compensa-
bility -being suggested here.
2. What has the condemnee lost?
Those courts that adopt a rule of law that seeks to determine
not what the condemnor has taken, but instead what ithe condemnee
has lost, arrive at a very dramatic distance from the results just ob-
served.' 26 To these courts, the issue is not a question of property law,
but rather a determination of what the result between landlord and
tenant would have been if the condemnation had not occurred. If the
fixtures could be removed, the tenant is entitled only to have them
considered in connection with the value of his remaining unexpired
term, and -in doing so, the cost of their removal may be relevant to such
valuation. If there is no remaining unexpired term at the time of con-
demnation, the cost of removal of ithe fixtures is irrelevant, and not
recoverable.
A lessee upon a condemnation can recover the fair market value of
his unexpired interest. Trade fixtures installed by the lessee were con-
sidered in determining such fair market value, since the condemnation
"did not deprive the (lessee) of the ownership of or the right to remove
the property. . . .The appropriation . . . did not take the fixtures
and machinery placed upon the demised premises .. ."127
able value in the hands of a dealer who is equipped to seek out a buyer and
is prepared to store the machine until he does.
Id. at 814, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 38. One is reminded of the words of Judge Cardozo inJackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 35, 106 N.E. 758 (1914):
It is intolerable that the State, after condemning a factory or warehouse, should
surrender to the owner a stock of second-hand machinery and in so doing dis-
charge the full measure of its duty ...
126. How dramatic the result can be is seen in Southern California Fisherman'sAss'n v. United States, 174 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1949), where the court adopted both
theories in the same case. The tenant erected improvements removable on thirty day
notice. After the notice was given, but before the removal had occurred, the con-demnation occurred and the condemnor took possession of the land and improvements.The court held that the tenant's measure of damages was the reasonable value of theimprovements removed from the land. The fair market value of the improvements,
of course, was vitally affected by the requirement that they be removed in thirty days.
Appellants' position that because the Government did in fact receive both land
and improvements and should therefore compensate for land improvements as a
unit shifts the basis of evaluation to what the taker gained rather than what
the owner lost.
Id. at 740 (emphasis added). See also State v. Pahl, 257 Minn. 177, 100 N.W.2d
724 (1960).
127. Consolidated Ice Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 224 Pa. 487, 494, 73 A. 937, 939(1909). See also Korengold v. Minneapolis, 254 Minn. 358, 95 N.W.2d 112 (1959) ;
Baltimore v. Gamse & Bros., 132 Md. 290, 104 A. 429 (1918) ; Emery v. BostonTerminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 59 N.E. 763 (1901) ; Metropolitan West Side Elevated
R.R. Co. v. Siegel, 161 Ill. 638, 44 N.E. 276 (1896). Some courts are fond of noting
that the fixtures were not condemned because the tenant had the right to remove
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If the fixtures were not condemned, how were they considered
in determining the lessee's damages? As was stated in Consolidated Ice
Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. :128
The value of the leasehold proper for the unexpired term would
be what the premises would be worth for any purpose for which
they could reasonably be used over and above the rental and other
charges payable by the lessee. To this must be added the use value
of the machinery and fixtures until the expiration of the lease.
These are not substantive elements of damage but are for the con-
sideration of the jury in estimating the (condemnee's) loss by
being deprived of the residue of the term. 2'
In arriving at the fair market value of .the fixtures, however, since
they were not condemned and had to be removed, consideration was
given only to their value as severed from the freehold. As was stated
in Iron City Automobile Co. v. Pittsburgh:8 0
[I]f a purchaser had appeared upon the scene to take over the
lease, the fact that the holder thereof would be obliged to remove
the business with the machinery to another location would, of
course, cause the prospective lessee to diminish his bid for the
balance of the term accordingly; hence, the cost of removal and the
depreciation in value of the machinery were proper elements for
consideration and deduction in measuring the value of the lease.'
Merely to state this rule is to expose its difficulty of practical
application. If a lessee under a ninety-nine year lease installed heavy
machinery and trade fixtures costing $100,000 to remove, a condem-
nation in the fifth year of the leasehold was to the tenant's great
detriment. The lessee's right to remove these fixtures at the termination
of the lease was obviously not seriously considered in the business
judgment of their installation. If the same property however, was
condemned in the ninety-seventh year of the lease, the removal
and depreciation cost of the machinery and fixtures would bear no
them as against the landlord. United States v. 1.357 Acres of Land, 308 F.2d 200
(7th Cir. 1962) ; People v. Auman, 100 Cal. App. 2d 262, 223 P.2d 260 (1950) ; Los
Angeles County v. Signal Realty Co., 86 Cal. App. 704, 261 P. 536 (1927). Other
courts hold that unless the tenant has the right to remove, no recovery can be had
against the condemnor and all damages inure to the landlord for the improvements.
See notes 83, 86 & 87 supra and accompanying text.
128. 224 Pa. 487 (1909).
129. Id. at 494. Accord, United States v. 1.357 Acres of Land, 308 F.2d 200 (7th
Cir. 1962); United States v. 425,031 Square Feet of Land, 187 F.2d 798 (3d Cir.
1951) ; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 250 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ;
People v. Auman, 100 Cal. App. 2d 262, 223 P.2d 260 (1950) ; Minneapolis St.-Paul
Metropolitan Airports Comm'n v. Hedberg-Friedheim Co., 226 Minn. 282, 32 N.W.2d
569 (1948) ; see also Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 315, 317 (1949).
130. 253 Pa. 478, 98 A. 679 (1916).
131. Id. at 486, 98 A. at 685.
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relation to the value of the remaining unexpired term. Such costs,
in addition, would be irrelevant to the possibility, or probability, of
having the lease renewed. The greatest problem occurs, however, when
there is no unexpired leasehold to value. A favorite device of land-
lords is the use of a "condemnation clause" which terminates the lease-
hold as of the date of the condemnation. 112 Here, the question is: When
a condemnation clause terminated the leasehold, was the removal and
depreciation costs of a tenant's trade fixtures recoverable by the
tenant? The answer generally has been no.' 83
Courts have justified this harsh result on the theory that the tenant
is in the same position as he would have been if the lease had expired
normally at the end of its term. For example, in United States v. 1.357
Acres of Land,134 a condemnation clause terminated a lease which gave
the tenant the right to remove tenant-installed improvements in a bowl-
ing alley. It was undisputed that the fixtures were so attached or so
uniquely designed for their particular location in the condemned build-
ing that they could not be removed without destroying all but a negli-
gible salvage value. The Court upheld a denial of recovery, stating:
. . . we agree with the Lessor that Lessee was in the same posi-
tion when the property was taken as it would have been in at the
end of the term of the lease. Its right under the lease at the end of
the term was to remove the trade fixtures. This right would be
of no more value at the end of the ;term than it proved to be upon
the taking under condemnation.'3 5
This argument, however, ignores the probabilities of the tenant
renewing the lease if the term came to a natural end, and compares
such probability with the unforeseen development of having the term
abruptly ended by operation of a condemnation clause. The economic
consequences to the tenant due to governmental action are therefore,
borne by the tenant, even though these consequences were not bar-
gained for by him. In short, the condemnor is securing the benefit of
a lease clause inserted into the lease to protect the landlord in its claim
132. The purpose being to prevent the tenant from carving his claim for a remain-
ing unexpired leasehold from the owner's claim for the condemnation of the freehold.
133. State v. Chun, 91 Ariz. 317, 372 P.2d 324 (1962). See also United States
v. 1.357 Acres of Land, 308 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1962); United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 250 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ; People ex rel. Dep't of Public
Works v. Rice, 185 Cal. App. 2d 207, 8 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1960) ; Beverly Hills v.
Albright, 184 Cal. App. 2d 562, 7 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1960) ; Williams v. State Highway
Comm'n, 252 N.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 263 (1960); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 1523 (1923);
Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 312 (1949). Removal costs of personal property, of course, are
held not relevant to leasehold value, or compensable directly. See Williams v. State
Highway Comm'n, supra. Cf. Southern California Fisherman's Ass'n v. United States,
174 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1949) ; State v. Pahl, 257 Minn. 177, 100 N.W.2d 724 (1960).
134. 308 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1962).
135. Id. at 203. See also Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 59 N.E.
763 (1901).
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against the condemnor. There seems little justification for such benefit
inuring to the condemnor.'
V. MEASURE OF DAMAGES: ENHANCEMENT OF
VALUE AND THE UNIT RULE
A. Fee Owner
The above analysis suggests that the test for determining whether
fixtures form part of the condemned real estate should turn on the
extent to which the fixtures substantially lose their value if severed
from ,the realty. Assuming that the fixtures, under the test suggested,
do form part of the condemned realty, what is the condemnee to be
paid for them?
1. The Unit Rule
The question involved here is whether the condemnee can be paid
the separate value of his fixtures, measured by their in-place value, plus
the separate value of the buildings.
It is generally stated that the valuation of a condemned property
is not to be made by adding up the separate value of its component
parts, and evidence thereof is not to be admitted."3 7 This is the so-
called unit rule test which has strong verbal support in the cases.' 38
Nevertheless, it has been stated:
. . . it is to be observed that reasoned analyses of the theoretical
arguments for and against separate valuation of land and im-
136. As was stated in United States v. Certain Property, 388 F.2d 596, 601-02
(2d Cir. 1967):
Lessors do desire, after all, to keep their properties leased, and an existing tenant
usually has the inside track to a renewal for all kinds of reasons - avoidance
of costly alterations, saving of brokerage commissions, perhaps even ordinary
decency on the part of landlords. Thus, even when the lease has expired, the
condemnation will often force the tenant to remove or abandon the fixtures long
before he would otherwise have had to, as well as deprive him of the opportunity
to deal with the landlord or a new tenant - the only two people for whom the
fixtures would have a value unaffected by the heavy costs of disassembly and
reassembly. [While these possible purchasers might seek to take advantage of
the tenant's need to sell, an attempt to forecast the terms of a bargain that might
never have had to be made is altogether too speculative; as Judge Lehman in-
dicated, ". . . it is fairer that the cost of any error in approximation should fall
on the person who brought the problem about."] The condemnor is not entitled
to the benefit of assumptions, contrary to common experience, that the fixtures
would be removed at the expiration of the stated term. As Judge Lehman also
wrote in Allen Street, 256 N.Y. at 249, 176 N.E. at 381: "Choice lay with the
tenant and landlord, and how that choice would have been exercised rests in
speculation which does not concern the courts in this jurisdiction." (Footnote
included in brackets.)
137. For a collection of the cases, see Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 878 (1948). Notwith-
standing this rule, as indicated at Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d at 902-03, there are scores
of cases in which the court, in fact, did separately assess the damage to land,
buildings, and improvements.
138. See Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 878 (1948).
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provements in condemnation cases is notably lacking in the de-
cisions. In the rare instances where deliberate analysis has been
attempted, considerable doubt as to the complete universality of the
prohibition against separate valuation has been expressed. 13 9
Thus, in United States v. New York, 4 ° Judge Learned Hand
stated:
Indeed, we think it is an undue simplification to extract from the
books any "Unit Rule" whatever, in the sense of general authori-
tative directions. What has happened, so far as we can see, is that,
as different situations have arisen, the courts have dealt with them
as the specific facts demanded. One of these situations has been
when a parcel of land has been improved, and when - as is sub-
stantially always the case - it is impossible to separate the im-
provements so as to transfer them independently. 4 '
In 'this case the issue was whether separately owned improvements
located on fifty-three acre improved tract owned by the City of New
York could be separately valued. The division of ownership, together
with the size of the tract, made the unit rule totally inapplicable and the
court so held. Nevertheless, the reasoning of Judge Hand is relevant
to the problem presented here. It is unquestionably true that the value
of a stairwell, plus the value of an antique fireplace, plus the value of
a bathtub, etc., do not add up to the value of the entire house. 42 Nor
does the real estate appraiser, in the accepted practice of his profession,
value such items separately. 143 With fixtures and improvements, how-
ever, it is possible not only to separate the improvements for valuation
purposes, but, as we have seen, such practice is commonly accepted
in the appraisal profession. As Judge Hand stated:
The argument runs that . . . it is erroneous as matter of law
ever to add together a . . . "site" value and (an) improvements
value. The argument, so put, is undoubtedly a highly important
caution, when the attempt is made to appraise improved land by a
process of cumulation; but we question whether it has any further
office than to keep before the tribunal the only relevant objective;
the exchange value of the newly emerged unit.14
139. Id.
140. 165 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1948).
141. Id. at 528.
142. Nor, generally, does the separate value of growing crops, trees, shrubs, etc.,
add up to the overall value of the land. Saathoff v. State Highway Comm'n, 146 Kan.
465, 72 P.2d 74 (1937). See also Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 887 (1948).143. In most jurisdictions, a separate reproduction cost value of buildings, less
depreciation, is permitted. In re Blackwell's Island Bridge Approach, 198 N.Y. 84,
91 N.E. 278 (1910); 2 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN§§ 188-99 (2d ed. 1953); see, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-705(2) (iv)
(Supp. 1970).
144. 165 F.2d at 528.
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2. Enhancement of Value
Assuming that the separate value of the improvements can be paid
to the condemnee, and evidence thereof is permitted, does it necessarily
follow that the awarding tribunal should render an award by adding
the value of the improvements per se to the value of the land and build-
ings?'" The presentation of the evidence would be as follows: The
fixture appraiser would testify first. He would then be followed by the
real estate appraiser. Assume the fixture appraiser testifies that his
in-place value is $50,000, and the real estate appraiser testifies that his
fair market value, excluding the fixtures, is $100,000. Is the owner en-
titled to $150,000 in damages? As was stated in State v. Peterson:146
The final test is the market value of the property being con-
demned. If improvements on the property enhance the market
value then the value of those improvements is material; if improve-
ments do not enhance the market value, they are not material. 47
Hence, in Mayor of Baltimore v. Himmel,148 the condemned property
included land, buildings, and equipment. The court charged the jury
that it could consider the equipment "as part of said land and build-
ings . . . in estimating the damages to which the owners are en-
titled.' 1 49  The Court of Appeals of Maryland held the charge to be
error, since it enabled the jury to value each item of equipment sepa-
rately, and to add each separate item to its award. The court found
that the charge should have been: ". . . and the jury are instructed
to award the owners the present fair market value of the land taken,
as enhanced by the buildings and fixtures thereon."'5 0 It will be the
unusual case, however, in which -the enhancement in value caused by
machinery and equipment will be other than the in-place value of the
145. Cf. note 136 supra.
146. 134 Mont. 52, 328 P.2d 617 (1958).
147. Id. at 64, 328 P.2d at 624.
148. 135 Md. 65, 107 A. 522 (1919).
149. Id. at 73, 107 A. at 525.
150. Id. at 135, 107 A. at 526. This is the generally accepted charge in mostjurisdictions. Allen v. Boston, 137 Mass. 319, 320 (1884) ; Jackson v. State, 213
N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914). The condemnee, in Mayor of Baltimore, requested
the judge to charge that in addition to the value of the building, the petitioners were
entitled to recover the value of the fixtures taken with the building. This request
was denied. The court did charge, that the fixtures were to be taken into account
as being a part of the building, and that allowance should be made for them so far,
and only so far, as they enhanced the market value of the estate. See United States
v. Certain Land, 69 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) ; Dep't of Public Works v. Lotta,
27 Ill. 2d 455, 189 N.E.2d 238 (1963) ; Chicago v. Farwell, 286 Ill. 415, 121 N.E. 795(1918); Commonwealth v. Stamper, 345 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1961). In Marraro v.
State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606 (1963) (tenant), and United States v. Certain
Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962) (owner), however, the necessity of condemnee
to establish the enhancement requirement was pointedly ignored. In the latter case,
it was admitted that the building detracted from the value of the land. Nonetheless,
the condemnee was held to be entitled to the in-place value of condemned fixtures
because they would lose substantially all of their in-place value upon severance.
[VOL. 16 : p. 467
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fixture appraiser. The real estate appraiser can be expected in most cases
to accept and adopt the conclusion of the fixture appraiser in arriving
at an overall determination of the condemned property, which will
be the summation of the two appraisals. For example. in State v.
Dockery,15 1 witnesses testified to separate values of land, building, ma-
chinery, and equipment. They testified, however, that the condemned
property was enhanced to the extent of the estimated replacement cost of
the improvements, less depreciation. The court stated, therefore, that:
The true measure of damages . . . is the value of the property
as a whole. Such a value does not necessarily amount to the total
of the separate and unrelated values of land, structures and fix-
tures. The true measure is . . . the extent to which they enhance
the value of the land . . . [b]ut if the improvements are such as
to enhance the land value to the extent of cost of replacement, less
depreciation, then it is proper to arrive at the value of the whole
property by totalling the separate values of each. That is true in
this case.1 2
In any event, administratively, if it is determined from the report
of the fixture appraiser that the items in question do form part of the
condemned realty, then the report should be given to the real estate
appraiser for his determination of the extent to which the fixtures, so
valued and so forming part of the realty, enhanced the overall value of
the condemned property. The procedure would be administratively
similar to that permitted in Peoria, B. & C. Traction Co. v. Vance:15
The trees were a part of the land, and the value of the land neces-
sarily included the trees . .. The witnesses testified to the value
of the land without the trees, and also to its value with the trees.
In the opinions given the trees materially increased the value of
the land .... 154
Similarly, in State v. Gallant,15 5 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
stated:
Where, therefore, a building and industrial machinery housed
therein constitute a functional unit, and the difference between the
value of the building with such articles and without them, is sub-
stantial, compensation for the taking should reflect that enhanced
value.156
151. 300 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. 1957).
152. Id. at 451.
153. 234 Ill. 36, 84 N.E. 607 (1908).
154. Id. at 38-39, 84 N.E. at 608.
155. 42 N.J. 583, 202 A. 401 (1964).
156. Id. at 590, 202 A. at 405. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Gallant
indicated that the payment of damages to an owner for the substantial loss in value
of trade fixtures invoked a constitutional question. See note 169 infra, for a similar
conclusion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding
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B. Tenant
As already noted, the courts have disagreed as to whether, and on
what basis, the trade fixtures of a tenant are condemned and valued.
Those courts that have given effect to the lease agreement have held
that the tenant is only entitled to damages for trade fixtures to the ex-
tent that such damage measures the leasehold agreement between lessor
and lessee. Here, whether damages are to be awarded, and the measure
of such damages, does not involve the unit rule, since the test merely
determines the extent to which the removal costs of the fixtures en-
hanced the remaining unexpired leasehold."5 7 On the other hand, those
jurisdictions such as New York, which has long held that a tenant is
entitled to be compensated for his fixtures as being part of the con-
demned real estate, have only recently explored the implications of such
a holding insofar as the unit and enhancement rules of damages are
concerned. In In re Allen Street & First Avenue, 5 " the court held
that the fixtures must be included as condemned, and damages there-
fore paid to the tenant "to the extent that the value of the real property
as a whole is enhanced by the fixtures annexed thereto. . . ."19 It
was not until 1963 that the Court of Appeals of New York was faced
with the implications of that holding. In Marraro v. State,'60 the con-
demned building housed a pharmacy, a dress cutter, a supermarket,
and a dry cleaner. Each tenant was awarded the in-place value of his
fixtures. The State appealed, contending that since the fee owner was
not entitled to a separate award for its fixtures, the tenants were entitled
to share in a total award only to the extent that it was shown that
their particular fixtures enhanced the value of the entire building. The
Court of Appeals of New York, after reciting the language of Judge
Hand in United States v. City of New York,' 6 held that the unit rule
was inapplicable, stating:
A case like the present, with a large building peopled by different
tenants with individual trade fixtures, differs from a single factory
a tenant's fixtures. The New Jersey court, after discussing the constitutional obliga-
tion of the condemnor to pay just compensation, then stated:
We return now to the immediate problem before us, i.e., whether the concept ofjust compensation as outlined above may require that [condemnees] receive an
award for their looms. We believe it may ... [B]efore condemnation the looms
were an integral and valuable part of a going business housed in [condemnee's]
factory. Upon a condemnation [they] could either retrieve merely the looms'
second-hand value or, if they had elected to remove them to their new premises,
suffer the economic loss attendant upon the necessarily expensive and intricate
removal procedures. . . . [T]he injustice of non-compensation . . . is obvious.
Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
157. See notes 128 & 129 supra and accompanying text.
158. 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931).
159. Id. at 249, 176 N.E. at 382.
160. 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606 (1963).
161. 165 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1948).
[VOL. 16 : p. 467
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or warehouse where it is entirely appropriate that the machinery
should be valued according to its enhancement of the value of the
building.1
62
Having disposed of the unit rule, it then described the measure of
damages: "the rule of reproduction cost less depreciation is seemingly
suited to the purpose . -*."' The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has similarly adopted the holding in Marraro
as applying to federal government condemnation of real estate located
in New York State."" In a later case, 165 the Government again argued
that the unit rule was applicable, that the fair market value of the build-
ing as a unit, including any tenant trade fixtures, was to be determined
first, and each tenant was then entitled only to the amount by which
the fixtures were demonstrated to have enhanced the market value of
the building. The court stated:
Acceptance of this argument would indeed keep the word of promise
to the ear and break it to the hope. In most cases (it) would effec-
tively deny any significant compensation for the fixtures .... '"'
Until Marraro and the cases in the Second Circuit, those few jurisdic-
tions that held the issue of a tenant's damages to be a question of
property law, 16 7 nonetheless still seemed to hold that the measure of
damage of a tenant's condemned fixtures was the extent to which such
fixtures enhanced the value of the condemned real estate. 68 However,
the holdings of the Court of Appeals of New York and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, clearly presage the
desirable development of the law. To wit: A tenant will be deemed to
have fixtures forming a part of the condemned realty if the fixtures
would lose substantially all of their value upon severance, regardless of
the terms of the lease concerning termination of the leasehold upon
condemnation. The tenant will be entitled to be paid the in-place value,
without further proof of the extent of the enhancement of the con-
162. 12 N.Y.2d at 296, 189 N.E.2d at 612.
163. Id.
164. United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962).
165. United States v. Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965).
166. Id. at 146.
167. See pp. 491-97 supra.
168. See People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal. 2d 897, 151 P.2d 641 (1944) ; Jones v. New
Haven Redevelopment Agency, 21 Conn. Supp. 141, 146 A.2d 921 (1958); Roffman
v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 179 A.2d 99 (Del. 1962) ; Kansas City v. National
Eng'r and Mfg. Co., 274 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. 1955). Cf. United States v. Seagren,
50 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1931) ; State v. Olsen 76 Nev. 176, 351 P.2d 186 (1960);
Buffalo v. Michael, 16 N.Y.2d 88, 209 N.E.2d 776, 262 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1965) ; Bruno
v. State, 24 App. Div. 2d 681, 261 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1965) ; Kelder v. State, 22 App.
Div. 2d 999, 254 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1964) ; George's Bake Shop, Inc. v. State, 21 App.
Div. 2d 423, 251 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1964); and In re Brooklyn Bridge S.W. Urban
Renewal Project, 51 Misc. 2d 1005, 274 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1966), all of which
follow Marraro.
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demned real estate, and regardless of the unit rule. This result will be
easily administered, easily understood, and will bring order and a sense
of fairness now absent in the law concerning the compensation by a
condemnor of a tenant's trade fixtures upon the condemnation of the
real estate in which the fixtures are located.' 69
VI. CONCLUSION
The common law tests for the determination of fixtures - intent,
adaptabili-ty, and annexation - attempted to resolve conflicting status
claims in disputed items of property. Nevertheless, the same tests
have been applied in condemnation proceedings, where the issue is not
which party should prevail, but which party should bear the economic
consequences arising because of the condemnation.
The modern fixture appraisal determines the economic consequences
arising because of a condemnation to machinery, equipment and fixtures.
The appraiser can determine whether ;the fixtures can physically be
removed from the condemned premises, and if so, whether such re-
moval would cause them to lose substantially all their value.
The test of whether an owner's fixtures have been condemned as
part of the real estate should be whether the fixtures will lose sub-
stantially all of their value upon removal from the condemned premises.
If they will, the owner is entitled to be paid their in-place value if the
value of the condemned real estate has been so enhanced. In any event,
the owner is entitled to be paid the extent to which the in-place value
of .the fixtures has enhanced the value of the condemned real estate.
The test of whether a tenant's fixtures have been condemned should
also be whether the fixtures will lose substantially all of their in-place
value upon removal from the condemned premises. If they will, the ten-
ant is entitled to be paid their in-place value, notwithstanding the unit
rule, and notwithstanding whether the real estate has been enhanced
in value, since both of these rules are inapplicable in a tenant case.
169. There is recent authority that the result here suggested is constitutionally
mandated. In United States v. Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1965),
the court stated:
Indeed, . . . we are not at all sure that the issue has not been settled against the
Government on a constitutional basis by the Supreme Court's statement in General
Motors that "for fixtures and permanent equipment destroyed or depreciated in
value by the taking," the respondent is entitled to compensation.
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